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Introduction: scientific context and motivation 
 
 
 
This PhD thesis is comprised of three self-contained but related essays on the evaluation of capital 
subsidy policies. 
Capital subsidies are part of the place-based policies that industrialised countries have been 
adopting for decades in order to foster self-sustaining growth and boost capital expenditure, 
employment and competitiveness of firms located in their most underdeveloped areas. The place-
based approach relies on the principle that opportunities for growth exist in the entire territory, 
across all types of regions. Such principle is opposite to the one behind people-based policies - 
which aim to maximise the opportunities of the people and firms located in lagging regions by 
allowing them to migrate to and succeed in economic centres. Advocates of the place-based 
approach suggest that exogenous policy action is needed to trigger endogenous changes in lagging 
regions with persistent underdevelopment caused by the incapacity of such regions to maintain the 
pace of growth and development of leading regions and to make productive use of the resources 
available. 
A capital subsidy policy is typically a selective policy that provides grants to finance the most 
deserving investment projects, i.e. those projects that guarantee the most efficient use of public 
funds and the creation of new jobs in areas with a struggling industrial sector and high 
unemployment rates. However, the literature has shown scant systematic evidence on the 
achievement of such targets. 
Although a number of researchers have made substantial progress in improving the credibility of 
capital subsidies’ evaluations, many interesting research issues remain yet to be tackled. This thesis 
tries to make new developments on the following matters: the reduction of the selection bias, the 
implementation of a rough cost-benefit analysis, and the estimation of policy spillovers’ extent. 
One of the main reasons behind the considerable variation in the estimated impact of capital 
subsidies is due to the difficulties in facing the selection bias, i.e. in disentangling the policy effect 
from the most relevant confounding factors. Indeed, capital subsidy policies usually pick firms in a 
non-random manner causing the endogeneity of the assignment process. The policy effect should be 
measured as the difference between the average outcome of a group of firms composed of financed 
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firms and the average outcome of the same group in the absence of the policy. Obviously, data 
relative to the latter group of firms are not directly available; therefore, the challenge is to find a 
valid control group. To date, only a restricted number of papers have addressed the selection bias 
using credible approaches.  
Besides, at least in theory, the ultimate word on the effectiveness of a capital subsidy policy should 
lie with a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, very few researchers have tried to fill 
this gap, mainly because it is extremely complex, if not impossible, to include in the evaluation all 
the costs (especially in terms of distortion of the competition) and the benefits (most notably in 
terms of long run competitiveness of financed firms) brought about by a capital subsidy policy. 
Finally, the policy evaluators’ focus (almost) exclusive on the impact of the policy on subsidised 
firms’ outcomes does not seem to be justified considering the likely spatial externalities generated 
by the new subsidised investment. The lack of studies on capital subsidies spillovers is partially 
justified by the common reliance of the most adopted econometric methods on the Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). Such assumption holds if the causal impact of the 
subsidies on a firm does not depend on: 
1) the intensity of the subsidies and how the subsidies are dispensed; 
2) the subsidies that other firms receive, including competitors. 
The evaluation strategies based on the SUTVA do not model how firms affect each other’s but 
assume that even if they interact, the subsidies received by one or more of these firms do not 
influence the future outcomes of the other interacting firms. The SUTVA seems particularly strong 
especially when we consider competing firms. 
After a critical survey of the literature reported in Essay 1, the aforementioned issues are directly 
faced in Essay 2 and Essay 3. 
Essay 1: A critical survey on capital subsidy policies. Despite the long history of capital 
subsidies in most developed countries and the numerous evaluations of their effectiveness, there is 
no comprehensive survey in the literature. This essay aims to provide a complete review of the most 
relevant research works in such literature highlighting their main findings. Besides, the core threats 
to internal validity and the main issues that a researcher has to face in order to deliver a robust 
evaluation work are stressed. 
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Essay 2: The causal impact of capital subsidies: a multiple regression discontinuity design 
approach. This essay analyses the impact of a policy instrument - Law 488/92 (L488), the main 
Italian regional policy - that allocates subsidies to private firms by a multiple ranking system. 
Thanks to the peculiar L488 selection process that creates the conditions for a local random 
experiment, we are able to assess the effectiveness of these types of incentives for a relevant 
subgroup of firms. We propose a nonparametric multiple rankings regression discontinuity design 
that exploits the sharp discontinuities in the L488 rankings and extends the regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) approach to a context where the treatment is assigned by multiple rankings with 
different cut-off points. We find that the impact of the subsidies on employment, investment, and 
turnover is positive and statistically significant, while the effect on productivity is mostly 
negligible. The new subsidised capital is additional but non-complementary with the owner-
financed investment. The results are robust to different specifications and not due to intertemporal 
substitution. 
Essay 3: Beyond the SUTVA: how policy evaluations change when we allow for interactions 
among firms. The shortage of studies on spatial spillovers of industrial policies is rather surprising 
considering that such policies are usually designed for generating spatial externalities. In Essay 3 
we try to fill this gap proposing a new framework that partially relaxes the SUTVA assuming that a 
firm might interact only with firms having a limited economic distance from it (e.g. firms that 
belong to the same sector of activity) and that the intensity of these interactions is diminishing in 
distance and it does not extend over a certain threshold. This allows us to contrast the positive 
agglomeration effects with the negative cross-sectional substitution and the crowding-out effect. 
The global evaluation of the ATT and the spillover parameters shifts the spotlight from the policy 
effect on subsidised firms to the global effect of the industrial policy on the targeted territory 
making possible to determine if the subsidies have had a welfare-enhancing role in the 
underdeveloped regions. Analysing the effectiveness of the Italian L488 policy on firms located in 
peripheral areas, we find - in line with most of the literature - a positive and large effect of the 
policy on subsidised firms in terms of investment, turnover, and employment; however, the 
employment growth is in part determined to the detriment of affected untreated firms located in the 
very proximity of one or more treated firms that belong to the same sector of activity. This finding 
suggests that the ATT on itself is not a sufficient parameter to evaluate the effectiveness of an 
industrial policy and that we cannot rule out the possibility that the substitution effect (firms 
substitute labour with capital) might be in place. 
 4 
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1. A critical survey on capital subsidy policies 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
In the last decade there has been a surge in papers and reports on the dispute between place-based 
and people-based policies (see, inter alia, Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008; OECD, 2009; World Bank, 
2009; Farole et al., 2011; Barca et al., 2012). Advocates of the latter approach support policies that 
maximise the opportunities of the people (and firms) located in lagging regions by allowing them to 
migrate to and succeed in economic centres (Garretsen et al., 2013). They highlight the 
inefficiencies of regional policies that seek to spread growth and activity more evenly amongst 
regions, suggesting the existence of a “trade-off” between the pursuit of regional equity and 
national efficiency. Their considerations are supported by the new economic geography models 
showing that spatial agglomeration raises national economic growth because the localised, self-
reinforcing positive externalities and spillovers involved increase innovation and productivity. 
On the other hand, the place-based approach relies on the principle that opportunities for growth 
exist in the entire territory, across all types of regions (see, among others, Pike et al., 2006; Barca, 
2009). The aim is to maximise national output by encouraging each individual region to reach its 
growth potential from within.
1
 Advocates of this approach suggest that exogenous policy action is 
needed to trigger endogenous changes in lagging regions with persistent underdevelopment caused 
by the incapacity of such regions to maintain the pace of growth and development of leading 
regions and to make productive use of the resources available.
2
 It is from this view of economic 
development that policies targeting underdeveloped areas have arisen. 
                                                        
1 A new developmentalist approach suggests that local and regional development policy should not just be about 
promoting greater growth, but also about reducing levels of inequality, and that mobilising resources in lagging and/or 
peripheral areas may constitute a valid recipe for both greater overall growth and lower territorial polarisation. More 
importantly, it suggests that tackling local and regional inequalities may be necessary for the achievement of national 
wellbeing (Tomaney, 2010). Indeed, an excessive concentration of economic growth in a few areas […] is not only 
costly in terms of territorial cohesion and equity, but particularly on the ground of economic efficiency itself (Camagni 
and Capello, 2010). 
2 Such structural inequalities are considered circular and cumulative when skilled human capital emigrates to leading 
regions, weakening innovative capacities in lagging regions, leading to adverse selection effects for the existing 
population and for political behaviours and institutions, in a “vicious circle” scenario (Farole et al., 2011). Layard 
(2006) argues that although migration may lead to higher income, the negative effects of loss of family stability and 
higher crime rates tend to dominate the income gain. 
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In a period of growing dispute among proponents of place-based and people-based policies, the 
referee’s role should be played by empirical evidence. This paper aims to contribute to this heated 
debate surveying one of the most popular place-based policies: business capital subsidies.
3,4
 This is 
typically a selective policy that provides grants to finance the most deserving investment projects, 
i.e. those projects that guarantee the most efficient use of public funds and the creation of new jobs 
in areas with a struggling industrial sector and high unemployment rates. The new additional 
investments should help to modernise production processes, introduce more up-to-date 
technologies, and generally increase the competitiveness and viability of subsidised firms in terms 
of their ability to produce new products and processes and/or produce existing products more cost 
effectively (Harris and Robinson, 2004). Indeed, capital subsidies are supposed to foster self-
sustaining growth boosting capital expenditure, employment and competitiveness of firms located 
in underdeveloped regions but there is scant systematic evidence on the achievement of such 
targets. In this paper we will try to extrapolate the most relevant findings from the empirical 
literature on the effectiveness of capital subsidy policies directed to areas or regions with particular 
problems of underdevelopment and/or unemployment, leaving out of the review innovation 
policies, programmes directed only to urban areas, and employment subsidies. This is made all the 
more necessary by literature reviews of papers on business incentive programmes that usually mix 
the findings on capital subsidies with findings on other place-based policies set up following 
different rationales, such as R&D, SMEs, FDI, and EZs. 
The paper has been organised as follows: the next section summarises the theoretical rationales for 
and against business incentive programmes. Section 1.3 describes the evaluation problem due to the 
presence of selection among treated and how it has been faced in the literature, followed by a 
presentation of the main findings in Section 1.4. A detailed review of the most common problems 
that policy evaluators have to face when dealing with capital subsidy policies is reported in Section 
1.5. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes. 
 
 
                                                        
3 The expressions “investment incentives” and “business incentives” will be used interchangeably with “capital 
subsidies”. 
4 To be more specific, we will focus our analysis on developed countries rather than developing countries. This 
distinction is necessary because problems such as migration and poverty are much more pervasive in developing 
countries (see Carvalho et al., 2006). 
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1.2. Why governments should (or should not) finance capital subsidy 
programmes? 
In the last decades, business incentive programmes have been charged with the most diverse 
inefficiencies. Possible dynamic inefficiencies have been suggested by several authors. For 
example, Lee (1996) and Harris and Trainor (2005) suggest that targeting, which could be seen as a 
form of protection, might make subsidised firms overreliant on “production” subsidies, causing a 
failure in reorganising their activities and improving their performances to the same extent as non-
assisted firms that face the same competitive market pressures. Moffat (2013) denounces another 
possible problem of dynamic inefficiency due to supporting plants that would otherwise be forced 
to close. Indeed, capital subsidies may impede the Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction” 
that creates growth in the economy by shifting resources from low- to high-productivity plants. A 
related matter is pointed out by Bergstrom (2000), who claims that politicians and bureaucrats 
might be more interested in maximising political objectives than in economic efficiency; therefore, 
resources might be suboptimally allocated. It is also likely that incentives are offered in some cases 
primarily to give politicians “talking points” or “bragging rights” regarding their role in expansions 
whose true cause cannot be clearly identified by the electorate (Gabe and Kraybill, 2002). In 
addition, the assignment process of the subsidies might cause an allocative inefficiency 
incentivising subsidised firms to choose the K/L combination that maximises the likelihood of 
receiving the subsidy instead of the optimal combination of resources. 
Among others, Harris and Trainor (2005) highlight the likely deadweight loss due to the 
information asymmetry between businesses and the government. Indeed, intertemporal substitution 
might be in act, i.e. subsidised firms may pocket the subsidies and simply bring forward projects 
originally planned for the post-intervention period. Moreover, Criscuolo et al. (2012) point out a 
particular form of deadweight loss: large firms could “game the system”, i.e. they could increase 
employment at subsidised plants at the expense of employment in unsubsidised plants. 
What works for subsidised firms does not necessarily work for subsidised territories; in other words 
capital subsidies might engender the cross-sectional substitution and the crowding-out effect. The 
former effect implies that subsidised firms take some of the investment opportunities that 
unsubsidised firms would have exploited in absence of the policy; whereas, the crowding-out effect 
is in act if subsidised firms crowd-out of the market non-subsidised firms. Furthermore, non-
subsidised firms partly finance the subsidies trough taxation (see Bergstrom, 2000) and it is possible 
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that they experience negative general equilibrium effects such as an increase in the price of capital 
(see Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006).
5
 
On the other hand, capital subsidies have been also considered capable of generating some positive 
effects as investment in additional capital  is  a prime  determinant  of  national  rates  of  
productivity  growth (see De Long and Summers, 1991). Capital subsidies can be adopted to 
overcome credit market imperfections helping the market to achieve efficiency if some companies 
are denied access to credit despite the fact that they have viable business projects (Felsenstein et al., 
1998).
6
 
As noticed by Bergstrom (2000), in the literature on regional economics one line of research argues 
that various forms of market failure give rise to agglomeration effects. For example, economies of 
scale and location advantages associated with easy access to large markets, skilled labour and 
technological knowledge, in combination with migration of the most highly skilled members of the 
labour force from the lagging regions, might lead to growing polarisation between different 
regions.
7
 Business incentives - supporting firms located in the backward regions or firms that decide 
to relocate in the backward regions - are seen as a way to shift this development path (see Devereux 
et al., 2007). 
Business incentive programmes might also compensate for local external diseconomies
8
 and induce 
firms to locate their investment in backward areas kick-starting a growth process in underdeveloped 
areas.
9
 Besides, competition in capital subsidies is seen as a way to trigger endogenous changes and 
move the economy of low-income regions towards a more efficient equilibrium (see Essay 3). 
Finally, it is important to stress that investment subsidy policies try to boost the investment level in 
lagging regions reducing the cost of capital and the theoretical effect that this has on employment is 
unclear (see May, 1979; Schalk and Untiedt, 2000). Policies targeting regions with high 
                                                        
5 Criscuolo et al. (2012) argue that in case of policies with funds much smaller than the national GDP, general 
equilibrium effects are negligible. 
6 Credit constrained firms may not be able to pay the required fixed costs to enter new markets or introduce new 
production technology. Policymakers might also face such market failure using soft loans (see Bondonio and 
Greenbaum, 2014, for an empirical comparison between soft loans and capital grants). 
7 Severe regional disparities can strain the fabric of national unity and generate social conflicts. It is argued that regional 
incentives can reduce that strain and provide a sense of fairness, regional balance, and stability in the country and also 
minimise welfare dependency by encouraging entrepreneurship and economic self-reliance (Cohen and LeGoff, 1987). 
8 Lagging regions usually supply lower wages than advanced regions but their advantage is limited by lower levels of 
labour productivity. In fact, what matters to firms in choosing their location are unit labour costs or “efficiency wages”: 
in advanced regions, a high productivity generated by a strong industrial culture, efficient services and good 
infrastructure may well outweigh the disadvantage of higher salaries and generate a continuing external competitiveness 
(Camagni and Capello, 2010). 
9 However, incentives might be too small or too broad in scope or offered for too short a period of time to trigger the 
decision to invest or induce large location shifts away from the optimal location. As a result, incentives will often 
influence investment decisions at the margin (Cohen and LeGoff, 1987). 
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unemployment rates usually try to create jobs; this is why some capital subsidy programmes 
deliberately reward projects with an extra use of labour. In case of creation of both additional and 
better-paying occupation, capital subsidies may boost worker’s skills, self-confidence, and 
reputation with employers. This greater human capital may increase some workers’ long-run 
employability and wages (Bartik, 2012). 
1.3. The Most Common Evaluation Strategies 
If public funds would be allocated by a random process, an optimal method to evaluate the impact 
of capital subsidies would be a simple difference between the outcomes of treated and untreated 
firms (assuming that the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption, SUTVA, holds).
10
 
Unfortunately, the assumption of random assignment is not credible when the policy instrument 
determines a deliberate selection process. If a business incentive programme picks firms in a non-
random manner, the participation is endogenous and the projects are heavily selected. To avoid 
selection bias, the policy effect should be measured as the difference between the average outcome 
of a group of firms composed of financed firms and the average outcome of the same group in the 
absence of the policy. Obviously, data relative to the latter group of firms are not directly available; 
therefore, the challenge is to find a valid control group. 
Other than being pervasive in most observational studies, selection bias is almost unanimously 
considered the most relevant problem in the evaluation of capital subsidy policies. Indeed, as well 
recognised in Bondonio and Greenbaum (2014), any enterprise support policy must be evaluated 
disentangling programme effects from many confounding factors affecting firms and economic 
growth outcomes independently from the programme being evaluated. 
The typical target of policy evaluators is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
parameter, however also the local average treatment effect (LATE) and the intention to treat (ITT) 
parameters have been recently estimated. In the last two decades different evaluation techniques 
have been used to estimate such average causal effects of capital subsidies on firms’ performances. 
The most well-known evaluation techniques have been harnessed: from the regression model to the 
                                                        
10 The SUTVA holds if: 
i) there exists only one version of the treatment, i.e. the subsidy intensity is constant for each treated firm; 
ii) the subsidies that other firms receive (including competitors) do not affect firm’s i potential outcomes. 
See Section 1.5 for a discussion on what happens when the SUTVA does not hold. 
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more recent regression discontinuity design. In this section, we will review the most common 
evaluation strategies highlighting merits and limitations of each methodology.
11
 
The Regression Model. The most basic approach to evaluate the impact of investment incentives 
consists in regressing the outcome variable on a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm 
received the subsidies. The validity of such approach depends on the nature of the relationship 
between firms’ performances and the policy. If the best performing firms - those with high levels of 
managerial competence, good products, innovative etc. - are the most likely to get the subsidies, a 
positive result derived from a simple regression based on ordinary least squares (OLS) is likely 
subject to an upward bias. Likewise, if the subsidies are more likely to be assigned to poor-
performing firms, then a simple regression will probably underestimate the impact of the policy. A 
first solution to this selection problem is the addition to the regression model of a set of control 
variables, supposed to exogenously influence the outcome variable. 
The regression model requires assumptions on the functional form (often assumed to be linear) of 
the dependency between the outcome variable and the observed covariates. Even if the addition of 
control variables would probably ease the selection bias problem, most researchers use this model 
only as a preliminary method in their analysis, adopting more sophisticated methods to further 
reduce selection bias. 
Matching Methods. Matching methods ex post mimic an experiment by matching each financed 
firm to one or more non-financed firms as similar as possible with respect to a given set of pre-
treatment variables X. The main advantage offered by matching is that being a non-parametric 
method, unlike the regression model, it does not require functional form assumptions.
12
 However, 
the dimensionality of the space of the matching variables can represent a serious limitation to the 
implementation of matching. Indeed, if there are a high number of covariates, it may be difficult to 
identify a non-subsidised firm to match with every subsidised firm. A popular alternative is to 
match on a function of the X: the probability of assignment given the set of characteristics X. This 
matching method is named Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The correct use of the PSM requires 
that firms with the same propensity score must have the same distribution of observable (and non-
observable) characteristics independent to the treatment status. This hypothesis is called the 
                                                        
11 For a more general overview of these methods see Blundell and Costa Dias (2009). Bondonio (2009) reviews and 
discusses statistical techniques aiming at offering some clear guidance on how to choose the appropriate focus of the 
evaluation, the policy relevant evaluation parameters and the empirical impact identification methods for evaluating a 
variety of types of business incentive programmes. 
12 Matching methods represent an improvement over the linear regression model also for two other reasons. First, the 
regression model makes use of observations outside the common support. Second, the regression model does not allow 
weighing control observations in order to build ex post a control group with pre-treatment variables distributions similar 
to the ones of the treated group. 
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“balancing hypothesis” and can be tested for observable variables. Moreover, PSM can be 
combined with the Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the impact of capital subsidies on 
the likelihood of plant exits. 
Matching methods mainly rely on two crucial assumptions. First, the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA), i.e. they assume that all the relevant differences between subsidised and non-
subsidised firms are captured in their observable attributes (selection on the observables). Second, 
the common support assumption, i.e. every subsidised firm has at least one counterpart in the 
control group with the same or very similar observable characteristics. Especially the CIA is a 
strong assumption and the possible presence of selection on the unobservables is unaccounted for 
by matching methods. 
Difference-in-Differences (DID). The difference-in-differences (DID) estimator exploits some 
naturally occurring event that makes a certain group of firms eligible to capital subsidies but keeps a 
similar group ineligible. This method requires longitudinal data (at least 2 time periods) and 
consists in a before and after comparison across these groups of firms. The DID estimator delivers 
unbiased estimates of the ATT only if two difficult to meet conditions are satisfied: 
i) The assignment process does not depend on temporary shocks;13 
ii) Without the subsidies, the trends of the performances relative to the treated group and 
the control group would have stayed unchanged. 
In this literature, such approach might not be appropriate as the required naturally occurring events 
are hard to find for capital grants programmes. 
The Difference-in-Difference Matching estimator (MDID). Combining matching methods with 
the difference-in-differences estimator (MDID) allow formulating the main matching hypothesis 
with respect to the before-after evolution instead of levels. In fact, first-differencing outcomes with 
respect to a pre-programme period removes selection on the time-invariant unobservables 
(individual fixed effects and trend effects), while comparing the first-differentiated outcomes for 
participants with those of observationally identical non-participants removes selection on the 
observables. In other words, the MDID represents an improvement over both matching and DID 
because it weakens the identifying assumption for matching by allowing non-observed time-
                                                        
13 E.g. evaluating with the DID an investment incentive policy that targets only firms with a growing investment level in 
the last years would probably deliver upwardly biased ATT estimates. 
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invariant variables to influence performance. However, time-variant unobservables cannot be 
controlled for and after the MDID procedure there might still be some residual selection bias. 
The Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. In contrast to matching methods, the instrumental 
variables (IV) approach deals directly with selection on the unobservables. The IV method requires 
the existence of at least one variable exclusive to the assignment rule, known as the instrument. 
Such instrument is supposed to affect only the eligibility to receive the subsidies without having a 
direct impact on firms’ performances; this is why it is not included in the set of conditioning 
variables. This is known as the exclusion restriction. It implies that the potential outcomes do not 
vary with the instrument and any difference in the mean observed outcomes of two groups of firms 
differing only with respect to the instrument can only be due to consequent differences in the 
eligibility and composition of the treatment group with respect to potential gains from treatment. 
Depending on the assumptions on the homogeneity/heterogeneity of the policy effects and the 
specific application, the IV estimator allows retrieving the ITT, the ATT or the LATE parameters. 
In this literature it is rare to adopt the IV because of the difficulties in finding a good instrument that 
can be argued to satisfy the exclusion restriction. 
The Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). When capital grants are assigned following an 
assignment rule in which the probability of receiving the incentives changes discontinuously with 
some continuous variable s, researchers might exploit this particular source of randomisation to 
estimate the LATE under relatively weak assumptions. In case s fully determines the assignment of 
incentives on the basis of a threshold, s
*
, this approach is called sharp regression discontinuity 
design (RDD).
14
 With the sharp RDD treatment impacts are estimated by comparing the outcomes 
from the applicant firms ranked just above and below the cut-off point that determines the treatment 
status. This is because in such neighbourhood of the threshold the treatment status can be thought of 
being nearly randomly assigned. This method is typically considered to have a high internal validity 
and an external validity depending on the homogeneity of the characteristics of assisted firms 
throughout the entire population of treated. Evaluations based on the RDD require a capital subsidy 
policy following the afore-mentioned assignment process and the availability of data on the ranking 
for both treated and non-treated firms. 
The Heckman selection estimator. When selection is on the unobservables, one attractive 
approach to the evaluation problem is to take the nature of the assignment rule explicitly into 
consideration in the estimation process. The Heckman 2-step estimator does exactly this, treating 
                                                        
14 When s does not fully determine the assignment of subsidies, it is still possible to retrieve the LATE parameter using 
s as an instrument in the IV method. Such approach is called fuzzy RDD. 
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the endogeneity of the assignment as an omitted variable problem. In a first step the probability of 
participation in the investment support scheme is estimated using a probit model and the so-called 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) set-up which should measure the influence of the unobservable variables 
in the selection process. Then, in a second step the IMR is introduced into the investment regression 
equation. By estimating this enhanced equation the correlation between the explanatory variables 
and the error terms is eliminated. In these terms, a positive (negative) and significant coefficient on 
the IMR is indicative of a positive (negative) sample selection problem, analysed policy being 
skewed towards high (low) performance firms. An important issue in operationalising the Heckman 
type model is the avoidance of too much overlap between the selection and performance models. 
This is why it is highly advisable to include variables in the first stage probit equation which are not 
included in the second stage investment equation. The latter approach could also be seen as a 
variant of the more general IV method. The main threats to validity of this parametric method lie in 
the untestable strong structural assumptions. 
1.4. Main Findings 
In the literature, there is a considerable variation in the estimated impact of investment support, 
which, among others, reflects differences in circumstances between countries,
15
 regions, sectors and 
firms, differences in the design of policy and delivery (policy implementation details) and 
differences in the quality of the data and the analytical methods used in the empirical studies 
(Brandsma et al., 2013). With this in mind we will attempt to retrace the main findings of this strand 
of literature
16
 gathering together the findings of 3 groups of relatively homogeneous research works 
carried out in the last 20 years.
17,18
 Table 1.1 presents synthetically all the surveyed studies, 
                                                        
15 For instance, in this survey we will look at papers on capital subsidy programmes adopted in the UK, the Republic of 
Ireland, Italy, Germany, Estonia, Sweden, Poland, Finland, Greece, and the USA. 
16 We exclude from our review studies that evaluate the effectiveness of capital subsidies directed to areas or regions 
with no particular problems of underdevelopment or unemployment (e.g., Gabriele et al., 2006; Bia and Mattei, 2012; 
Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2014). We also exclude studies that evaluate more than a regional policy together and do not 
distinguish among policies (e.g., Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2001; Girma et al., 2007b). Finally, we do not consider 
studies that evaluate the effectiveness of investment incentives through the administration of surveys to the subsidised 
firms (see National Audit Office, 2003; Cannari et al., 2006). 
17 Empirical evaluations of capital subsidies can be divided between area-based and firm-based analyses. In this review 
we focus on the latter category of studies due to the considerable complexities in disentangling the policy impact from 
other confounding factors at the area level (see Bondonio, 2009) and the predominance of area-based analyses that do 
not distinguish the causal effect of capital subsidies from other policies established on different rationales. Besides, 
even if some of the surveyed studies analyse also the effectiveness of other policies we will refer to them only for the 
parts on investment incentives. 
18 Until the end of the 1980s, evaluation techniques of business incentive programmes were rarely based on a 
counterfactual approach. Indeed, trend projections, case studies, surveys concerning a small number of scheme 
participants, shift-share analyses, basic econometric models, and theoretical models combined with analyses of 
aggregated data were the most widely used methods to evaluate the effectiveness of capital subsidy programmes. 
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reporting their main findings.
19
 An overview of the most analysed capital subsidy policies is 
reported in Appendix 1.A. 
1.4.1. Studies based on a theoretical framework 
A first subgroup of studies is based on the presence of a theoretical framework that drives the 
empirical analysis. Most of these research works aim to estimate the impact of capital subsidies on 
the total factor productivity (TFP). Indeed, such type of estimation requires a production function 
approach (usually a Cobb-Douglas specification).
20
 
Using an OLS estimator, Bergstrom (2000) finds that growth through subsidisation has been 
achieved simply by using more inputs but not by improving on their usage. Moreover, his results 
suggest that the more subsidies a firm is granted the more inefficient it becomes. Similar results 
come from Harris and Robinson (2004) using a policy off/policy on model and a GMM estimator. 
On the other hand, Harris and Trainor (2005) using a similar approach find that without capital 
subsidies, the TFP would have been between 7-10% per annum lower throughout the analysed 
period. 
Harris and Robinson (2005) break down TFP into its allocative components (entry, exit, within 
plant, between plant and cross-plant effects) applying a decomposition approach. They find that 
financed plants experienced negative TFP growth, mostly due to plants with low TFP increasing 
their market share during the period. A different decomposition procedure allows Skuras et al. 
(2006) to decompose into three components the TFP (technical change, technical efficiency change, 
and scale efficiency change). They find that capital subsidies to the food manufacturing sector are 
not fully additional and affect TFP growth mostly through technical change. 
                                                        
19 Relevant insights on the effectiveness of business incentives come also from the theoretical literature. In a Diamond-
Mirrlees (1971a and 1971b) setting (an economy with competitive markets, constant returns to scale, and flexibility in 
choosing different commodities taxes for different goods), firm-specific capital subsidies are considered not desirable as 
they distort the allocation of factors of production causing productive inefficiency. In a similar vein, Sinn and Sinn 
(1993) argue that regional public support schemes give rise to excessively capital intensive production that contributes 
to the unemployment problem. On the other hand, Fuest and Huber (2000) develop a theoretical model where union–
firm bargaining distorts both employment and investment decisions and investment subsidies dominate employment 
subsidies in terms of welfare. Finally, Brandsma et al. (2013) find that investment incentive policies that impose 
additionality in perfectly competitive markets cause distortions in the capital market and lead to lower welfare levels. In 
contrast, without the enforcement of additionality, the distortions are zero and the investment support fully benefits the 
firms. In an imperfectly competitive environment, the firm-level investment support may increase investment and may 
be welfare increasing with and without the enforcement of the investment additionality. However, a complete account 
of theoretical studies on capital subsidies is beyond the scope of our survey. 
20 Growth of TFP is a productivity measure which reflects the increase of total output that is not explained with increase 
of capital and labour. The TFP is considered by some authors as the most relevant productivity measure for analysing 
the efficiency of a subsidised firm. Indeed, while labour productivity (output per worker) may grow simply because of 
the capital deepening induced by the subsidies, the efficiency with which all inputs are used (measured by the TFP) may 
not increase at all. 
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Finally, Devereux et al. (2007) focus on a different research question using a model of firm location 
choice to study the influence of capital subsidy programmes on the location choice of 
manufacturing firms. Adopting a conditional logit model they find that grants have a small effect in 
attracting plants to specific areas. Besides, their results suggest that these subsidies are less effective 
in influencing firms’ location decisions in the face of alternative locations offering countervailing 
co-location benefits or natural advantages. 
1.4.2. Statistically driven studies 
We can split the statistically-driven studies in 2 subgroups depending on their credibility. Ideally 
retracing the steps of the credibility revolution illustrated in Angrist and Pischke (2010),
21
 we will 
use 3 criteria for the afore-mentioned split: i) the internal validity of the evaluation strategy; ii) the 
quality of the data; and iii) the presence of robustness checks. While the first point has already been 
discussed in Section 1.3, in the following we briefly illustrate points ii) and iii). 
Most evaluation strategies require detailed data on unsubsidised firms to build a valid 
counterfactual scenario. As the majority of capital subsidy programmes are selective, the best case 
scenario is the one with data on rejected applicants.
22
 Besides, administrative data are usually to be 
preferred to survey data, as administrative datasets are typically larger, collected in a more 
consistent way and subject to more rigorous quality checks. Furthermore, in order to increase the 
statistical power of the methodologies adopted and enlarge the pool of firms from which build the 
counterfactual, it is important for researchers to have available a large number of treated and non-
treated firms. Finally, the presence in the dataset of numerous covariates makes easier to control for 
selection on the observables. 
Another good property of evaluation papers is the use of robustness checks. An estimation result is 
robust to changes in model specification if the inference a researcher makes with respect to the 
tested hypothesis or prediction does not change. Among the most used robustness tests there are 
alternative measures of the dependent variables, additional controls, changes in the sample, 
alternative estimators, and alternative functional forms. Besides, the robustness of the results should 
                                                        
21 In the last two decades improvements in empirical work have come from many directions: i) better data and more 
robust estimation methods; ii) more focus on causal interpretation of the main findings; iii) empirical researchers in 
economics have increasingly looked to the ideal of a randomized experiment to justify causal inference; iv) more 
transparent discussion of research designs; and v) robustness checks (see Angrist and Pischke, 2010). 
22 As suggested by Brown et al. (1995), rejected applicants show a propensity for investment very similar to that of 
subsidised firms. Moreover, control observations should come from eligible areas, as the use of firms located outside 
eligible areas will probably generate a bias in the causal effect estimates (see Moffat, 2013). 
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be assessed by employing tests specific to the methodology adopted, such as the balancing test for 
the PSM or the continuity of the density test for the RDD.
23
 
1.4.2.1. Studies that do not meet all the credibility criteria 
The last column of Table 1.1 reports why the following studies do not meet all the credibility 
criteria. Besides, as the selection of research works is not clear-cut, we exercise a degree of 
discretion in classifying the studies. 
Employing a Cox proportional hazards model, Girma et al. (2007a) and Harris and Trainor (2007) 
find that grant payments have helped recipient firms to survive longer. Using a less rigorous 
approach, Trzciński (2011) finds a negligible impact on survival rates of subsidised firms. 
Evidence is more mixed for employment. Pellegrini and Carlucci (2003) use matching, DID and a 
rough version of the RDD finding that subsidised firms present an employment dynamic from 3 to 
15 percentage points higher than in non-subsidised firms. Along these lines, both Gadd et al. (2009) 
(adopting the MDID estimator) and Trzciński (2011) (adopting the PSM) find a positive effect on 
employment. Opposite results have been found by Gabe and Kraybill (2002) using the Heckman 2-
step estimator, Kangasharju and Venetoklis (2002) using the DID approach, and Ankarhem et al. 
(2010) using the MDID estimator. 
Concerning profitability outcomes, Gadd et al. (2009) and Ankarhem et al. (2010) find a negligible 
or negative impact of capital subsidies. Finally, Hartsenko and Sauga (2012) find a positive effect 
on net sales using the DID estimator, Gadd et al. (2009) a positive effect on net turnover, while in 
the GEFRA-IAB (2010) report a plethora of evaluation techniques has been used (linear regression 
model, PSM, DID, Heckman selection model) and the results show that treated manufacturing firms 
have higher investment per employee of around €9,000-€12,000. 
1.4.2.2. State of the art empirical studies 
Criscuolo et al. (2012) use an IV approach exploiting exogenous changes to area-level eligibility as 
key form of identification.
24
 They find evidence for a positive ATT in terms of employment and 
                                                        
23 Another possibility is the use of sensitivity analysis to separate the fragile inferences (based on doubtful assumptions) 
from the sturdy ones. An example of sensitivity analysis is the extreme bounds analysis that determines the range of 
estimates that the data could support given a precisely defined range of assumptions about the prior distribution (see 
Leamer, 2010). 
24 Examining the impact of capital subsidies both at the firm-level and at higher levels of aggregation they capture both 
extensive (plant entry and exit) and intensive margins (growth by incumbents). 
ESSAY 1: A CRITICAL SURVEY ON CAPITAL SUBSIDY POLICIES 
17 
 
investment. At the area level they also find that the programme raised employment and the higher 
manufacturing employment seems to come from reducing the level of unemployment. These results 
are strong for smaller firms but essentially zero for larger firms. Using the MDID estimator, Bernini 
and Pellegrini (2011) reach similar conclusions on investment and employment. They also find that 
output and value added grew substantially in subsidised firms. On the other hand, Bronzini and de 
Blasio (2006) adopt a DID combined with a rough version of the RDD or with an ad-hoc 
comparison group that mirrors the time-series pattern of the treated group before the programme 
was launched and find some evidence of intertemporal substitution. 
Finally, negligible or negative effects on labour productivity or TFP are found in Bernini and 
Pellegrini (2011), and Criscuolo et al. (2012). This might be due to firms overshooting the optimal 
amount of employment in order to gain a subsidy. 
Concerning the impact of capital subsidies on plant survival a positive effect has been found in two 
recent papers. Moffat (2013) combines the PSM and the Cox proportional hazards model finding 
that capital subsidy grants reduce on average the probability of closure by 15-20%. Adapting the 
RDD approach to the survival analysis framework, Muccigrosso and Pellegrini (2013) find 
consistently higher survival probability in subsidised relative to non-subsidised start-ups: a 
statistically significant difference in favour of the treated firms is observed with respect to firm 
survival, particularly regarding the seventh year of life (approximately 30%). Nevertheless, the 
discrepancy decreases thereafter. 
From the review of the most credible empirical studies emerges an almost homogeneous set of 
results that can be summarised in a positive impact of capital subsidies on financed firms’ 
employment, investment and plant survival prospects but a negligible effect on productivity. 
However, these results are still not sufficient to determine a final conclusion on the effectiveness of 
this policy and future research should continue on the credibility path addressing in more depth the 
issues that will be delineated in the next section. 
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1.5. Empirical evaluations: common concerns and future challenges 
Most policy evaluators identify selection bias as the most pervasive threat to the internal validity of 
evaluation studies; however, selection bias is only the first of a long series of concerns. In this final 
section we review the main issues that evaluators have to implicitly or explicitly address in order to 
carry out a thoughtful evaluation work. 
Failure of the first SUTVA assumption: different subsidy intensities. The first SUTVA 
assumption states that there exists only one version of the treatment. If this was true a capital 
subsidy policy might be evaluated without any distortions using a binary variable to indicate the 
assignment of the subsidies (as in the vast majority of the surveyed studies). However, several 
policies allow for different levels of subsidies, depending on the investment project, the firm 
dimension, the region and also the firms’ choice. Policymakers are particularly interested in 
exploring the impact of different treatment levels on policy outcomes as this may uncover 
heterogeneities along different amounts of financial aids and provide some information on the 
optimal level of incentives (Bia and Mattei, 2012).
25
 Indeed, the adoption of a binary variable 
derives mostly from an econometric literature that has developed evaluation strategies with a binary 
treatment variable in mind that are difficult to extend to a continuous treatment variable setting. 
Different methodologies have been adopted to analyse the impact of different subsidy intensities, 
such as the 2-step matching estimator (see Adorno et al., 2007), the 3-stage conditional DID (see 
Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2014), and the generalised propensity score estimator (see Bia and 
Mattei, 2012). 
Failure of the second SUTVA assumption: the presence of policy spillovers. The second 
SUTVA assumption states that the subsidies that other firms receive (including competitors) do not 
affect firm’s i potential outcomes. It is a leap of faith to consider this assumption completely 
satisfied for investment incentive programmes as policies oriented to the growth of underdeveloped 
regions are designed for generating spatial externalities (De Castris and Pellegrini, 2012). 
Potentially, these programmes give rise to several externalities, such as the agglomeration effect, 
the cross-sectional substitution and the crowding-out of non-subsidised firms. If a selective business 
incentive policy brings about negative (positive) spillover effects on unsubsidised firms located in 
the vicinity of one or more subsidised firms, the evaluation strategies described in Section 1.3 will 
                                                        
25 A continuous treatment level approach might help policymakers to minimise the extent of deadweight loss. For 
instance, if such approach demonstrates that a capital subsidy programme is subject to decreasing marginal returns in 
correspondence to high per-firm values of assistance, policymakers might reduce deadweight loss lowering the 
maximum percentage of the total investment cost covered by capital grants. 
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deliver: i) an upward (downward) estimate of the ATT; and ii) no estimates of the spillover effects 
(see Essay 3). 
As data cannot reveal the extension of spillovers, the failure of the second SUTVA assumption 
remarkably complicates the evaluators’ work because possible solutions involve the adoption of a 
set of strong assumptions on the extension and/or the nature of the spillovers. 
Data concerns. The probability of success in minimising selection bias is positively related to the 
richness of data on the selection process and the availability of data on a large pool of non-
subsidised firms; yet such information is not always available in the desired amount. In addition, 
even in situations with plentiful data it might be difficult to find a credible counterfactual for the 
firms with the best (worst) investment projects as they are almost always subsidised (non-
subsidised). As such, even when evaluation works claim to retrieve the ATT they sometimes 
implicitly exclude the causal effect on the most deserving investment projects or they estimate such 
causal effect relying on stronger assumptions. 
Addressing selection bias is difficult enough that sometimes evaluators overlook the discussion 
about other empirical concerns such as the ones regarding data availability. Data are not always 
available for all the eligible firms and in general small and medium enterprises are underrepresented 
in the sample as the probability of inclusion of an eligible firm in a financial dataset is inversely 
proportional to its size. Besides, in case of longitudinal data researchers usually assume that missing 
values in certain years are randomly distributed throughout the panel, conversely, data on small 
firms are more likely to be missing and this might distort the causal effect estimates. In addition to 
that, as evaluations of industrial policies often require merging different datasets, they might be 
subject to a decrease in the number of observations due to the possible typing mistakes and/or the 
presence of mergers, changes of names and activities of some firms in the time-period considered. 
Other than the possible presence of measurement errors and outliers (as in almost every 
observational study), when dealing with firms’ data, a researcher has to take also some important 
decisions on relevant clusters of observations that affect the subsequent analysis: i) firms that 
disappear from the dataset during the time span analysed; ii) assisted firms that received only part of 
the subsidies; and iii) assisted firms for which the grants were revoked. The widespread solution is 
to exclude these categories from the analysis but this might generate substantial biases. 
Moreover, it is not always clear what the best dependent variables to use are and if it is best to use 
absolute changes or percentage changes of certain dependent variables. A cautious solution might 
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bring to an empirical analysis with a wide spectrum of dependent variables but this might 
complicate the interpretation of the results. 
Coexisting policies. In most regions, capital subsidy programmes are not implemented in a 
vacuum, i.e. they coexist with other competing enterprise support programmes and this further 
complicates their empirical analysis. The coexistence of different policies in the same territory 
requires an additional assumption for single-programme evaluations based on a counterfactual 
scenario approach: the probability of firms gaining access to additional unobserved regional or 
national programmes incentives is the same across both the assisted firms and the comparison group 
firms that did not receive assistance from the single observed programme being evaluated 
(Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2014).
26
 Comprehensive data on the whole array of the coexisting 
policies are necessary to test for this additional hypothesis; nevertheless, they are rarely available. 
Only a few studies exploit information on all payments of government grant assistance obtaining a 
causal effect estimate for each programme (e.g., Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2014). The availability 
of comprehensive data makes their analyses immune from any bias due to the presence of other 
types of financial assistance. On the other hand, multiple schemes evaluation strategies might limit 
the use of evaluation strategies based on a natural experiment event and can reduce the pool of 
control firms making difficult to build a valid counterfactual scenario for each policy. 
The cost-benefit analysis. Whenever the topic is public spending, it is important to establish if the 
money has been used efficiently. This surely applies to industrial and regional policies. Such 
assessment calls for one of the most valuable tools available to economists: the cost-benefit 
analysis. Indeed, at least in principle, an all-inclusive cost-benefit analysis is entitled to the last 
word on the viability of a government outlay. However, in this strand of literature the 
implementation of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is extremely complicated, especially 
because of the difficulties in performing a complete account of the costs and benefits of investment 
incentive programmes. General equilibrium effects such as those due to distortions between 
subsidised and non-subsidised firms and the need for financing the subsidy with distortionary taxes 
are impossible to gauge using the counterfactual framework. 
Two interesting parameters for a rough cost-benefit analysis are the cost per job and the 
complementarity between the subsidised investment and the rest of the firms’ investment activities. 
                                                        
26 Quite often such assumption is implausible and findings from single-programme evaluations can suffer from 
attenuation bias (in the most frequent cases in which non-assisted firms are more likely to gain access to other forms of 
incentives than assisted firms) (Bondonio, 2009). The Italian Law 488/92 is an exception because one of its features is 
that firms applying for the incentives renounce any other public subsidies, even without any guarantee of receiving the 
Law 488/92 funds. 
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However, only a few studies on capital subsidies have retrieved an estimate of the cost per job 
parameter (Kangasharju and Venetoklis, 2002; Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2014; Criscuolo et al., 
2012)
27
 or have analysed the complementarity between the subsidised investment and the rest of the 
firms’ investment activities (the GEFRA-IAB report, 2010). 
The long term evaluation. The study of the long term effects of an industrial policy is at least as 
important as the study of the short term effects. Unfortunately, the most common evaluation 
strategies based on the counterfactual scenario may not be suitable to assess long-lasting impacts of 
capital subsidies on assisted firms, as such firms are economic units embedded in a network of 
mutual economic transactions. In the long run, a possible positive program shock on the 
employment of each single assisted firm is likely to have enough time to generate subsequent 
impacts on non-assisted firms as well. Those outcome data become endogenous to the treatment and 
can no longer be considered unaffected by the program incentives and used to retrieve 
counterfactual estimates (Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2014). 
A possible solution is to find non-treated firms that can be argued to have characteristics similar to 
treated firms but with potential outcomes independent from the policy even in the long-run. 
Although feasible, such an evaluation strategy would be based on fairly strong assumptions. 
A related problem consists of deciding how long one should follow the firms after the subsidies 
have been granted. If one uses a period that is too short, there is a risk that the evaluation will 
misrepresent the success/failure of the subsidies. Having too long a time span may make it difficult 
to isolate the effects of the support. What is too short and too long is difficult to say (Bergstrom, 
2000). 
A final list of issues. Business incentives are usually directed to a specific investment project and 
not to a company in general. As evaluation analyses are commonly carried out on companies’ key 
investment variables, they might not reveal the overall impact of the new investment, especially in 
the short term. 
Another aspect that complicates empirical analyses is that a non-negligible portion of firms have 
two or more establishments, some of which could even be located in different regions or countries. 
It is possible that some establishments are located in an eligible area, while the others outside of it; 
this could bring about the substitution of resources from non-eligible establishments to subsidised 
                                                        
27 This parameter does not factor in the dampening effect on aggregate productivity of keeping open the less productive 
firms or the money saved by the government from paying less out in unemployment benefits and other forms of welfare 
for workers who are drawn into employment (Criscuolo et al., 2012). 
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establishments in order to pocket the money without any additional investment (see Criscuolo et al., 
2012).  
To conclude this list of issues, it is important to notice that most industrial policies do not have just 
a single assignment process but a number of them (called bidding rounds); moreover, such policies 
usually allow the same firms to receive the subsidies more than once for different investment 
projects. Taking into account these aspects would complicate the evaluation procedure even further 
(especially the study of long term effects). 
1.6. Conclusions 
In the words of Pike et al. (2006), policy is bedevilled by the unclear evidence of its impacts and 
capital subsidy programmes are no exception. Looking at the whole literature, systematic empirical 
evidence is sketchy, to say the least; however, the studies that we consider the most credible show a 
much more homogeneous evidence: a positive impact of capital subsidies on financed firms’ 
employment, investment and plant survival prospects but a negligible effect on productivity. This 
does not mean that researchers are breaking the secret code of perfect evaluations, but only that the 
credibility path is the one to follow in future research works. 
This review has also highlighted the most relevant problems in the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
the public subsidies on firms’ performances. We believe that pointing out the limitations and the 
challenges of empirical studies is the best way to orientate future research towards more credible 
evaluations. In the last decade some of these challenges have been undertaken but further research 
is needed to shed some more light on the effectiveness of capital subsidies. 
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Appendix 1.A. Description of the most analysed capital subsidy programmes 
Despite the general prohibition of state aid in the EU, in some circumstances government 
interventions is necessary for a well-functioning and equitable economy.
28
 Capital subsidy policies 
of the EU countries comply with the guidelines designating very deprived “Objective 1” areas in 
which higher rates of investment subsidy can be offered, and somewhat less deprived “Objective 2” 
areas where lower subsidy rates are offered. There is an upper threshold called the Net Grant 
Equivalent (NGE) which sets a maximum proportion of a firm’s investment that can be subsidised 
by the government. In the last decades the EU determined maximum subsidy rates have differed 
over time and across areas. 
In the following we present 3 of the most relevant investment incentive policies in Europe. 
The Italian Law 488/92 (L488) 
See Section 2.2.2 of Essay 2. 
The Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) in the UK 
The stated chief aim of RSA is to safeguard and create employment opportunities in designated 
Assisted Areas (disadvantaged areas characterized by low levels of per capita GDP and high 
unemployment)
29
 by offering a discretionary subsidy to plants in the form of a capital grant. That is, 
RSA provides money towards capital investment projects that secure employment opportunities. 
RSA is heavily targeted at the manufacturing sector and a sub-aim of RSA is to increase foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into Assisted Areas. 
In addition to offering some sort of commitment to safeguard or expand employment, firms that 
wish to apply for RSA funding (primarily to expand or modernize) must meet the criteria set out 
below. First, to be eligible, firms must be located in an Assisted Area. In addition, the firm must 
                                                        
28 Article 87 of the Treaty of Amsterdam states “any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any 
form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market”. 
However exceptions are allowed in particular circumnstances such as: 
i) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany, 
insofar as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by that division; 
ii) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is 
serious underemployment; 
iii) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not 
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. 
29 Whether an area is eligible for any RSA is determined by a series of quantitative indicators of disadvantage which 
were changed over time but always included per capita GDP and unemployment (both relative to the EU average). 
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demonstrate that the project to which the grant is to be directed is itself viable (within 3 years). The 
project must be shown to be additional, which means that the investment would not have taken 
place in the way that it did without government support. It is also a requirement that any award of 
RSA funds does not result in displacement within the Assisted Area (i.e. that by providing funding 
within a region to a firm, the government is not causing other competing firms to close or cut 
employment). If successful, the government financed a proportion of the project which was up to 
35% in some years. 
There are slightly different arrangements in Northern Ireland where the equivalent of the RSA is 
business support funded under Selective Financial Assistance (SFA). 
Regional Investment Grants (RIG) in Sweden 
In Sweden, RIG directly to firms go back to the 1960s, when firms were given grants if they made 
new investments in outlying regions with free capacity. RIG became even more common during the 
1970s and more oriented towards reducing distributional differences across regions. However, from 
1990 onwards, grants have been targeted more towards promoting economic growth. Grants are 
limited to firms that have a market outside their own county or that face competition from outside 
the county. In order to receive RIG, the firm must apply in writing to the County Administration 
Board or the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (NUTEK), including a business 
plan and a description of the expected results. A processing officer decides whether the application 
is entitled of receiving support, taking into account the economic situation of the firm. For example, 
firms with lower probability of receiving financial support from commercial banks are more likely 
to receive grants so that high-risk projects are overrepresented. It is also evaluated whether the firm 
can expand and survive in the future. Small firms and investments expected to increase integration 
and equality in society are also given priority. For a firm to be eligible for a subsidy, it must be used 
for investments in machinery, equipment, buildings or a service activity that is aimed to increase the 
market for the enterprise.  Depending on the region, grants can cover up to the 40% of the total 
investment cost. This policy constitutes the largest regional policy-instrument directed towards 
promoting firm performance in Sweden. 
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2. The causal impact of capital subsidies: a multiple regression 
discontinuity design approach 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Business support programs are popular industrial policies used by most governments in the EU and 
other industrialised countries to foster competitiveness, self-sustaining growth and employment, 
most notably in disadvantaged areas. A huge amount of funds are spent each year on regional 
policies and subsidies or “state aid”.1 Not surprisingly, several studies have evaluated the extent of 
the economic payoff of these subsidies (see, inter alia, Roper and Hewitt-Dundas, 2001; Harris and 
Trainor, 2005; Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2014; Criscuolo et al., 2012); however, the literature is 
still relatively limited considering the importance of the topic. Moreover, there is little consensus 
among economists on the effectiveness of investment incentives. In a time of limited public 
budgets, this is clearly a hot issue. An example is the recent debate raised among scholars with 
different views about the effectiveness of these types of programs and the presentation of the Report 
on state aids commissioned by the Italian Government to well-known economists (Giavazzi et al., 
2012). In such report, the authors claim that the literature shows no evidence in favour of the 
effectiveness of incentives to private firms; therefore, they propose cutting €10 billion in state aid to 
firms and using the money to reduce firms’ taxation. Nevertheless, there is hardly a unanimous 
standing in the literature, as clearly shown in Chapter 2 of the GEFRA-IAB report (2010) and in 
Essay 1. 
Assessing the effectiveness of these types of incentives is basically an empirical question, but 
evaluating the impact of business incentive programs is a challenging task (Bondonio, 2009). The 
main problems are due to the difficulties faced in isolating the effects of the subsidies from the 
confounding effects induced by other factors and in controlling for the high selection bias. This is 
why credible micro-econometric evaluations are rare in the literature.  
                                                 
1
 Excluding crisis measures, since the early 2000s the share of state aid for industry and services as a percentage of 
GDP in the EU-27 economies has been stable, amounting to 0.5% in 2011 (EU Commission, 2012). On top of this, 
national governments themselves also spend large amounts (EU member states devote 1% of GDP on average) on 
regional policies and subsidies or “state aid” which are allowed by the EU up to a certain degree, which depends on 
how “disadvantaged” the region is (Dupont and Martin, 2006). 
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In this paper, we present a robust econometric analysis of the causal effect of capital subsidies to 
private firms by exploiting an unusual characteristic of an important regional policy in Italy that 
creates the conditions for a local random experiment. We analyse the impact of subsidies distributed 
by Law 488/92 (henceforth L488), which has been the main policy instrument for reducing 
territorial disparities in Italy during the period 1996-2007. This law has been characterised by a 
rigorous and transparent selection procedure. Each year, subsidies are allocated to a broad range of 
investment projects through regional “calls for tenders”, which mimic an auction mechanism. In 
each regional “call for tender”, the investment projects are ranked on the basis of a score that 
depends on a number of (known) characteristics of both the project and the firm. Projects receive 
subsidies according to their position in the ranking system until the financial resources granted to 
each region are exhausted. 
L488 has financed firms in both northern (Objective 2 or 5b) and southern regions (Objective 1) of 
the country;
2
 however, the subsidy intensity is by far higher in the latter areas, following the map of 
state aid delineated by the European Commission (De Castris and Pellegrini, 2012). This is why we 
analyse only incentives to the southern regions (Mezzogiorno), i.e. the southern section of the 
Italian Peninsula (Abruzzi, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, and Puglia) and the two major 
islands (Sardinia and Sicily).
3
 
The presence of sharp discontinuities in the L488 rankings allows using a quasi-experimental 
method deriving from a regression discontinuity design (henceforth RDD) approach, enabling us to 
identify the causal effect of subsidies on firms’ performances. Due to the presence of multiple 
rankings by regions and years, we use different ranking cut-off points. Therefore, we modify the 
classical RDD framework, proposing a nonparametric multiple rankings regression discontinuity 
design (henceforth MRDD) that brings the RDD to our treatment context. The main assumption is 
that, in each ranking, the best control group for the units just above the cut-off point is represented 
by the firms ranked just below the cut-off point (the firms that are not treated). Because we focus 
our analysis on the firms ranked around the cut-off point of each ranking, our parameter of interest 
is a local average treatment effect (LATE) that reflects the impact of the L488 subsidies on this 
subgroup of firms. 
                                                 
2
 In the southern regions, L488 has been financed not only with national funds but also with the EU Structural Funds 
(the southern regions were the only eight Objective 1 Italian regions in the 1994-1999 cycle of EU regional policies). 
3
 In the medium-large firms, the subsidy intensity with respect to the total investment is 40-50% in the southern regions 
and 10-20% in the northern regions (plus an additional 15% for small firms). Moreover, the limited concentration of the 
funds in northern regions and the circumscribed territorial extension of the Objective 2 and 5b areas (in 2000 about 15% 
of the northern regions population was covered by L488, i.e. 5.7 million inhabitants) allow neighbouring firms to easily 
delocalise their industrial plants into these areas, carrying out projects that would also have been realised without L488. 
Therefore, the additional effect of L488 should be much stronger in the Mezzogiorno. 
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The data we use come mainly from two sources: an administrative dataset containing detailed 
information on the instrument and a financial statement dataset covering the period 1995 to 2004. 
This time span is perfectly suitable for the evaluation of the short-term impact (1995-2001) of the 
L488 subsidies, as well as the long-term impact (1995-2004). 
Over the period from 1995-2001, the tangible capital growth rate is considerably higher in 
subsidised firms growing each year 14 to 17% faster than in non-subsidised firms (approximately 
doubling with regard to the median tangible capital in non-subsidised firms), while the yearly 
growth rate of turnover is as large as 6.5 to 8% higher in subsidised firms. Also the impact of L488 
on employment is positive: subsidised firms hire on average from 5 to 8 extra employees in respect 
to non-subsidised firms. On the contrary, the impact on the output per worker is mostly negligible. 
A year by year evaluation during the period 1995-2004 clearly shows that turnover and especially 
investment markedly increased during the years of the subsidies, and after that they grew at the 
same rate of the non-subsidised firms. We find that the subsidised investment is additional; 
however, subsidies do not trigger either positive or negative spillovers on the rest of the owner-
financed investment activities. On the whole, the results show that subsidies generate additional 
capital stock and productive capacity in subsidised firms but without a productivity improvement. 
Therefore, the analysis suggests that investment incentives cause a boost in private capital 
accumulation; however, this private benefit does not per se signal the usefulness of the policy from 
a social welfare perspective. For instance, in a Diamond-Mirrlees (1971a and 1971b) setting, firm-
specific capital subsidies are considered not desirable as they distort the allocation of factors of 
production causing productive inefficiency. Accordingly, we expect that L488 would engender a 
socially inefficient allocation of resources between treated and non-treated firms. Still, the 
conclusions of the Diamond-Mirrlees’ production efficiency theorem rely on assumptions 
(competitive markets, constant returns to scale, and flexibility in choosing different commodities 
taxes for different goods) that are hardly met in the Mezzogiorno. Here, widespread 
underdevelopment engenders imperfect and incomplete markets, undercapitalised firms, massive 
unemployment and a local economy far away from the production possibilities frontier. 
Consequently, L488 could represent a way to move the Mezzogiorno’s economy out of the “poverty 
trap” (see Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005), by increasing productive efficiency and social welfare.4 
                                                 
4
 An accurate analysis of the social optimality of L488 would require an investigation of the optimal deviations from 
production efficiency under a plausible set of assumptions. Such comprehensive evaluation of the social welfare effects 
is beyond the scope of our paper. 
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The paper has been organised as follows: the next section summarises the literature and presents the 
policy in more detail. Section 2.3 details the evaluation method, followed by a presentation of the 
data in Section 2.4. The results are discussed in Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 assesses their 
robustness. Section 2.7 concludes the paper. 
2.2. The previous literature and the L488 policy 
2.2.1. The literature 
Different business support schemes have been implemented in developed countries over the last 
decades, particularly in lagging areas. Non-repayable grants, interest-rate subsidies, equity 
participation and participation in venture capital are among the most adopted tools in industrialised 
countries (see Dupont and Martin, 2006). Evaluating the effectiveness of these tools is a pivotal step 
to orientate policymakers’ decisions and thereby optimise the use of taxpayers’ money. The 
evaluation literature has devoted particular attention towards the incentives to R&D as well 
documented in the surveys by García-Quevedo (2004) and Parsons and Phillips (2007). Recently, 
another policy has experienced a surge in the number of evaluation studies: the Enterprise Zones 
(EZs) program
5
 (see, among others, Ham et al., 2011; Givord et al., 2012; Busso et al., 2013). 
Instead, not as many policy evaluators have focused their research on the effectiveness of 
investment incentives to firms located in lagging areas. Besides, the empirical evidence is mixed: 
some analysts suggest that regional capital incentives can induce additional investment in 
subsidised firms (Faini and Schiantarelli, 1987; Harris, 1991; Daly et al., 1993; Schalk and Untiedt, 
2000; Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2014; Criscuolo et al., 2012); while others argue that 
intertemporal substitution effects prevail (Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006). Moreover, the 
employment impact of capital subsidies is doubtful (Gabe and Kraybill, 2002). Finally, the effect of 
subsidies on efficiency and productivity seems negligible or negative (Lee, 1996; Bergstrom, 2000; 
Harris and Trainor, 2005; Criscuolo et al., 2012). 
The selection process of the Italian L488 is particularly apt for the empirical evaluation of the 
investment incentive program. Starting in the late 1990s, a number of scholars have tried to evaluate 
the effectiveness of this policy
6
 (see, inter alia, Chiri et al., 1998; Scalera and Zazzaro, 2000; 
Carlucci and Pellegrini, 2003; Losurdo, 2004; Vadalà, 2005; Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006; Adorno 
                                                 
5
 In this program, delineated zones - usually neighbourhoods with socio-economic difficulties - are granted “special 
dispensation” status, and firms that choose to locate and invest in these zones benefit from temporary incentives such as 
tax rebates, job-trainings or relaxed regulatory barriers (Givord et al., 2012). 
6
 To increase the transparency and the accountability of the program, the data have been made publicly available by the 
Ministry of Economic Development. 
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et al., 2007; Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011), but none of the previous studies have exploited its 
features in a natural experiment framework like we do. 
Bernini and Pellegrini (2011) show evidence of higher growth in output, employment and fixed 
assets in subsidised firms but a less significant increase in Total Factor Productivity than in 
unsubsidised firms, while Adorno et al. (2007) highlight a positive but U-reversed relationship 
between the amount of subsidies and production. Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) investigate the 
presence of cross-sectional substitution (financed firms may receive some of the investment 
opportunities that non-financed firms would have otherwise had in the absence of the incentives) 
and intertemporal substitution (firms may have brought forward investment projects originally 
planned for the post-intervention period in order to take advantage of the incentives), and find 
evidence in favour of the latter substitution effect. However, none of these studies have properly 
exploited the auction mechanism as a source of local randomness. On the other hand, a proper use 
of the MRDD yields a compelling evaluation strategy: the method is locally equivalent to a random 
sampling procedure and the internal validity is high (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
2.2.2. L488 
Italy is among the European countries with the highest inequality in the distribution of wealth 
between different areas. In 1992 the Ministry of Economic Development issued L488, which has 
been the main policy instrument for reducing territorial disparities in Italy. L488 was fully 
operational in 1996. During the period 1996-2007, roughly 44,000 projects (over €23 billion) have 
been financed by L488. Most of this funding has targeted the Mezzogiorno, which comprises the 
least-developed regions of Italy. 
L488 allocates subsidies through a rationing system based on “calls for tender” that mimics an 
auction mechanism and that guarantees compatibility of demand and supply of the incentives. This 
policy makes available grants on capital account for projects designed to build new productive units 
in less-developed areas or to increase production capacity and employment, increase productivity or 
improve ecological conditions associated with productive processes, technological updates, 
restructuring, relocation and reactivation.
7
 
The Italian Ministry of Economic Development presides over the selection process. After receiving 
an application form that includes a technical report and a business plan, the relevant authority 
                                                 
7
 Firms that apply for the incentives renounce any other public subsidies, even without any guarantee of receiving the 
L488 funds. 
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performs a preliminary screening, evaluating the funding eligibility of the project. The amounts 
awarded are paid out in three equal instalments. 
Incentives are allocated on the basis of regional competitive auctions. In each auction, the 
investment projects are ranked on the basis of five objectives and predetermined criteria: 1) the 
share of owners’ funds on total investment; 2) the new job creation by unit of investment; 3) the 
ratio between the subsidy requested by the firm and the highest subsidy applicable;
8
 4) a score 
related to the priorities of the region in relation to location, project type and sector; 5) a score 
related to the environmental impact of the project.
9
 The five criteria carry equal weight: the values 
related to each criterion are normalised, standardised and added up to produce a single score that 
determines the place of the project in the regional ranking (this normalised score is the forcing 
variable used in the following analysis). The rankings are drawn up in decreasing order of the score 
awarded to each project and the subsidies are allocated to projects until funding granted to each 
region is exhausted. Several checks are made to determine whether subsidised firms have respected 
their targets. If a treated firm does not reach its goals, the subsidy is entirely or partially revoked. 
L488 auctions have been issued on a yearly basis. Our analysis refers to the period 1995-2004 and 
focuses on three of the four L488 auctions that were concluded by 2001. The timing of the 
assistance by auction is presented in Table 2.1.
10
 
Table 2.1. Timing of the assistance 
Source: Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) 
Auction Application 
deadline 
Presumed time of the 
1st instalment 
Presumed time of the 
2nd instalment 
Presumed time of the 
3rd (last) instalment 
1 Jun-96 Nov-96 Nov-97 Nov-98 
2 Feb-97 Jul-97 Jul-98 Jul-99 
3 Apr-98 Oct-98 Oct-99 Oct-00 
4 Nov-98 May-99 May-00 May-01 
Note: In many cases, administrative complications and technical and economic problems have increased 
the time span of the project (estimated at 3.6 years by Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011). 
 
                                                 
8 The lower this ratio, the more likely is the firm to obtain the subsidy. The highest subsidy applicable is determined by 
the EU and varies with the dimension of the firm (favouring small firms) and with the location of the production unit 
(favouring the most disadvantaged areas). 
9
 Criteria 4 and 5 were introduced at the 3
rd
 auction. These criteria are indicators that signal only the absence/presence 
of certain requirements. Firms that belong to a “target” sector/area and propose a project with a limited environmental 
impact have a higher probability of receiving the funds. 
For a detailed description of the rationale of each indicator, see Section 3 in Bernini and Pellegrini (2011). 
10
 The average time span of the financed investment is 3.6 years (Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011). 
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2.3. Econometric Evaluation Procedure 
2.3.1. The Multiple RDD 
The assumption of random assignment is not credible when the policy instrument (such as L488) 
determines a deliberate selection process. If a support programme selects firms in a non-random 
manner, the participation is endogenous and the projects are heavily selected. 
In the case of L488, data are available for the firms that applied for the incentives in the 
Mezzogiorno but were not financed because they scored too low in the L488 ranking. These non-
treated firms are willing to invest and have a valid investment project as checked by a preliminary 
screening. As a consequence, within each ranking, we can consider these firms as the best control 
group available; in fact, as suggested by Brown et al. (1995), they show a propensity for investment 
very similar to that of subsidised firms. Unlike in randomised experiments, this control group is not 
random, but we can use a quasi-experimental method to minimise the selection bias. 
The particular configuration of the L488 dataset - for each auction, there are as many rankings as 
the number of regions involved and each ranking has a different cut-off point - is similar to the 
dataset used by Black et al. (2007) in analysing a re-employment services system and the dataset 
addressed by Gamse et al. (2008) in evaluating the impact of an education program. In these papers, 
as in the whole empirical literature, there are two different approaches for exploiting the RDD to 
estimate the treatment effect across different rankings. The first approach consists of two different 
steps: first, estimating the treatment effect for each ranking; second, pooling the treatment effects in 
order to get the global treatment effect of the policy under analysis. The other approach pools 
observations from different rankings into a single dataset re-centring and standardising the forcing 
variable. In our paper, we apply the first approach because it allows us to exploit all the information 
available from the dataset, increasing efficiency, and unlike the pooling approach, it does not rely 
on the strong assumption of random allocation of subsidies to the firms ranked around the unique 
cut-off point.
11
 Nevertheless, we use the pooling approach as a robustness test. 
The methodological approach we propose can be named nonparametric multiple rankings 
regression discontinuity design (MRDD).
12
 Coherent to the configuration of the L488 dataset, we 
                                                 
11
 Pooling observations from different rankings could bias the LATE estimates due to the possible different 
characteristics of treated firms in different rankings. 
12
 Deriving from an RDD approach, it is worth stressing that the MRDD results can be applied to each unit that has a 
positive probability of being located near the relative cut-off point. Lee (2008) shows that if units do not have precise 
control over the forcing variable, variation in the treatment status in the neighbourhood of the threshold is randomised, 
as in randomised experiments. Even when units have some influence over the forcing variable, as long as this control is 
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extend the RDD to a context where the treatment is assigned by multiple rankings with different 
cut-off points. The main assumption is that in each ranking, the best control group for the units just 
above the cut-off point is represented by the firms ranked just below the cut-off point (the firms that 
are not treated). Aggregating the disaggregated estimates, this method exploits all the available 
observations in the L488 merged dataset; this feature of the MRDD improves the efficiency of the 
estimation process, making the resulting LATE estimates more reliable. 
The MRDD consists of two different steps: first, we apply a sharp RDD in each ranking, exploiting 
the sharp discontinuity determined by the forcing variable; in this way, we obtain a nonparametric 
estimation of the LATE in each ranking. Second, we aggregate the different first step estimates by a 
weight structure, where we use two weighting schemes. In the first, the weights are based on the 
number of firms close to the normalised cut-off point in each ranking. The second weighting 
scheme makes use of the inverse of the variances of the LATE estimates as weights. The MRDD 
estimator mimics a matching estimator in an RDD context: we can define each ranking as a 
“homogeneous stratum”, determine the best matching in each ranking using an RDD approach and 
compute outcome differences within “strata” using a specific cut-off point in each ranking, and 
finally integrate such differences over the distribution of the rankings in the treatment population to 
retrieve the global LATE. 
2.3.2. Potential problems with the use of the MRDD 
A potential limitation of the MRDD estimator is the small number of observations near some of the 
cut-off points, which creates a trade-off between bias and precision and makes not possible to 
determine a consistent estimation in some of the rankings. Moreover, because the auctions are 
issued roughly every year, another potential problem is the overlapping of subsidies to firms that 
have received incentives more than once during the period under analysis. However, the 
construction of the merged dataset has been carried out by attempting to minimise this problem (see 
Appendix 2.A). 
It could be possible that a firm that wins a project in one auction has some type of positive 
externality on other firms (e.g., increased supply) that then increases the choice probability of 
related firms in the subsequent auction. In our analysis, the auctions we considered were very close 
in time with respect to the average project time span. Hence, even if supply or demand spillovers 
                                                                                                                                                                  
imprecise - that is, the ex-ante density function of the forcing variable is continuous - the consequence will be local 
randomisation of the treatment. 
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are theoretically possible, from an empirical point of view they seem to be negligible (see Section 
2.5.2.2). 
There are also methodological implications in using a counterfactual approach based on balance 
sheet data: first, new firms’ performances cannot be evaluated; second, our sample is restricted to 
firms with a meaningful balance sheet (i.e., we use only corporate enterprises already active at least 
since 1994) that applied to an auction in the southern regions. Therefore, our results can hardly be 
extended to very small firms and to policy interventions in other (more developed) areas, such as 
the northern regions of Italy.
13
 
2.3.3. The econometric framework 
The MRDD approach is used for estimating the LATE of L488 on the economic growth of financed 
firms. In particular, we use as dependent variables: i) the yearly growth rate of tangible capital;
14
 ii) 
the yearly growth rate of turnover; iii) the cumulative investment from 1995-2001; iv) the per-firm 
employment change from 1995-2001; v) the output per worker in 2001. 
Let us briefly describe the model at the basis of our analysis.
15
 Let Yir (1) and Yir (0) denote the 
potential outcomes of firm i applied for ranking r. Due to the fundamental problem of causal 
inference (Holland, 1986), even if we are interested in the difference Yir (1) - Yir (0), we can only 
estimate an average treatment effect. Given the features of the MRDD, we focus on the LATE. 
Let Kir denote the treatment variable, with Kir =1 if the firm receives the subsidy and Kir =0 if the 
firm does not receive the subsidy. The outcome (yearly growth rate of tangible capital) for firm i 
can be written as follows: 
(2.1)     (     )     ( )         ( )  {
   ( )           
   ( )           
 
We consider the pre-treatment variable    : receiving the treatment (i.e., receiving the L488 funds) 
is assumed to depend only on whether the level of     is above or below the referring threshold. In 
our case,     is the sum of the indicators normalised for firm i applied for ranking r. Accordingly, 
                                                 
13
 On the other hand, taking into consideration different macroeconomic cyclical effect, our results are extendable to the 
subsequent L488 auctions and to other similar policies oriented to reduce territorial disparities in developed countries. 
14
 This is the average annual investment (in the period from 1995-2001) as a percentage of capital (1995). 
15
 This model derives from the Rubin causal model (see Holland, 1986). We use the yearly growth rate of tangible 
capital as dependent variable, but it is easily adaptable for the other dependent variables. 
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for a subsidised firm, the value     exceeds the relative cut-off point ( ̅ ):      *     ̅ +, with 
 ̅  depending on the ranking.
16
 
Firms with     below the value  ̅  are assigned to the control group (firms not subsidised because 
their scores were too low in the ranking). To find evidence of a local average causal effect of the 
treatment, we need to verify the presence of a discontinuity in the conditional expectation of the 
outcome: 
(2.2)       ̅  ,   |     -        ̅  ,   |     -     
In the case of sharp RDD, the LATE at each discontinuity point is as follows: 
(2.3)   
      ,   ( )     ( )|     ̅ -. 
Of course, it is not possible to observe for each firm i both the values    ( ) and    ( ). This 
implies comparing the average value of the yearly growth rate of tangible capital for treated firms 
and non-treated firms at     ̅ .
17
 
Accordingly, the average effect for each ranking writes as follows: 
(2.4)   
           ̅  ,  |    -        ̅  ,  |    -. 
Given this, we need to estimate two limits, approaching each  ̅  from the left and the right. As we 
will see below, such estimation is carried out using a nonparametric approach. Once every 
estimated effect and each standard error is computed, we need to aggregate these estimates to obtain 
the global average effect of subsidies on treated firms. 
The aggregation of different estimates is not a trivial problem because it is not easy to find an 
objective criterion to choose the weights of the estimates. An intuitive but arbitrary solution consists 
of using the number of observations in each ranking with a forcing variable value “close” to the 
normalised cut-off point, i.e., within the interval ± bandwidth chosen for the nonparametric analysis 
in the aggregated sample. 
                                                 
16
 This is a case of “sharp MRDD”, as the treatment (receiving the L488 funds) only depends on the level of    . 
17
 By design, we cannot observe    ( ) for the firms with      ̅ . Thus, we exploit units with covariate values 
arbitrarily close to  ̅  as counterfactual. In order to justify this averaging, we make a smoothness assumption (i.e., we 
assume that the relation between     and     is smooth around  ̅ ), known in the literature as “continuity of conditional 
regression functions”:  ,  ( )|    - and  ,  ( )|    - are continuous in X. 
This assumption is stronger than required, as we will only use continuity at     ̅ , but it is not reasonable to assume 
continuity for one value of the covariate X. Under this assumption:  ,  ( )|    ̅ -        ̅  ,  ( ) |    -  
      ̅  ,  ( ) |        -        ̅  ,  |    -. 
Thus, the value of the counterfactual outcome in     ̅  is equal to the limit of the conditional expected value of the 
outcome for non-treated firms. Similarly, for treated firms:  ,  ( )|    ̅ -        ̅  ,  |    -. 
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As a result, the global LATE of the L488 (     ) and the standard errors ( ) are computed as 
follows: 
(2.5)       ∑      
    
           ⁄ ; 
(2.6)   √∑                    ⁄ ; 
where, 
   is the standard error of the LATE estimate in ranking r, 
   is the number of firms inside the bandwidth interval in ranking r, and 
  is the total number of firms inside the bandwidth interval. 
Another possibility is resorting to an adaptation of the weighting by inverse variance solution 
common in meta-analysis studies
18
 to give more weight to the LATE estimates with smaller 
variances. This alternative weighting scheme makes use of the inverse of the variances of the LATE 
estimates as weights: 
(2.7)       (∑   
        
 ⁄ )          (∑    
 )⁄          ⁄ ; 
(2.8)   √ (∑     ⁄          ⁄ ). 
Given the sensitivity of the results to the estimator and the bandwidth in the nonparametric case, we 
will test the robustness of the MRDD results using the pooling approach. 
This additional analysis concerns a joined version of the dataset, in which the observations have 
been first normalised and then added up. This aggregation has been carried out by re-centring and 
standardising the forcing variable to create a dataset with a unique cut-off point (where every rs  is 
equal to zero) in order to retrieve the global LATE of subsidies with a simple RDD. We analyse this 
aggregated dataset both by a parametric and a nonparametric method. 
The nonparametric estimator is based on the local linear regression (see Fan and Gijbels, 1996; 
Hahn et al., 2001) with standard errors computed with the bootstrap; while, we use the OLS 
estimator with robust standard errors in parametric regressions, as suggested by Imbens and 
Lemieux (2008). Finally, several robustness tests are carried out to test for possible manipulation in 
the assignment of subsidies. 
                                                 
18
 For more detail on this procedure, see Marin-Martinez and Sanchez-Meca (2010). 
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2.4. Data and methodological issues 
2.4.1. Data 
Our econometric analysis is based on the integration of two different datasets. The first dataset 
comes directly from the Ministry of Economic Development and records all the firms that applied 
for an L488 auction, both financed and non-financed, providing important information such as the 
forcing variable, the firms’ ranking at the regional level and the timing of the instalments. This 
dataset lacks financial and economic information; therefore, we also need to use the AIDA dataset, 
i.e. a financial statement dataset that basically collects financial statements for corporations (for this 
reason, it is skewed towards larger firms).
19
 The integration between these two datasets requires a 
complex process of cleaning and merging. Combining these datasets permits us to compare the 
change in the treated firms’ performances to a control group of firms that applied for the incentives 
but did not receive any subsidy. 
The financial statement dataset used in our analysis extends from 1995 to 2004, allowing us to 
study the impact of the program over a period that includes pre-intervention as well as post-
intervention years for the auctions 2, 3, and 4 of L488.
20
 For these auctions, the treatment started in 
1997 (for firms subsidised in the 2
nd
 auction) and finished by 2001 (see Table 2.1). 
By linking the L488 dataset with the financial statement dataset, we reconstruct a merged dataset 
for the short-term analysis (1995–2001) for 1,702 firms that applied for “calls for tenders” in 
southern Italy.
21
 In the long-run the hypothesis that financed firms do not interact with non-financed 
firms becomes less and less reliable (see Bondonio, 2009); moreover, the larger the time span, the 
more problematic becomes to disentangle the causal effect of subsidies from increasingly relevant 
confounding factors. This is why we give prominence to the short-term analysis, exploiting the 
long-term analysis only to test for the presence of intertemporal substitution.
22
 The merged dataset 
                                                 
19
 AIDA is a large dataset that contains the budgets delivered by over 500,000 Italian corporate enterprises to the 
Chambers of Commerce (the financial information are standardised and made available by Bureau van Dijk). 
20
 The 1
st
 auction has been excluded from the analysis because it included a transitory clause that allowed firms not 
eligible under L488 to be financed as well (see Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006). 
21
 Of the 1,702 firms composing the aggregated dataset, 1,356 are non-duplicate firms (560 subsidised, 796 non-
subsidised). Indeed, as we explain in Appendix 2.A, for the MRDD analysis we have decided to keep duplicate non-
subsidised firms if they applied for the incentives more than once but were never subsidised until 2001 (for example a 
firm that scored too low both in the second and the third auction and was never financed until 2001). When we analyse 
the aggregated dataset in the robustness section we remove the duplicates (the results remain substantially unchanged 
when we repeat the same analyses keeping the duplicates in the control group). 
22
 It is crucial to test whether subsidised firms make additional investment or if they just bring forward investment 
projects that were originally planned for future periods. 
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for the long-term analysis (1995–2004) is composed by 709 firms. The detailed construction of the 
samples is described in Appendix 2.A. 
Exploiting the MRDD features, we have tested whether the pre-treatment characteristics of the 
financed firms are similar to those of the control group. As shown in Table 2.2, we find no evidence 
of statistically significant pre-treatment differences around the cut-off point between subsidised and 
non-subsidised firms in terms of investment, turnover, productivity, size, liabilities, and ROE.
23
 
Table 2.2. MRDD estimates of the pre-treatment differences in tangible capital, turnover, productivity, size, 
liabilities ratio, and ROE between subsidised and non-subsidised firms 
Note: Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parentheses. The interval ± bandwidth chosen for the nonparametric analysis in 
the aggregated sample is ±1.72. 959 firms (56.3% of the sample) have forcing variable values within this interval (428 
treated and 531 not treated). The variable liabilities ratio is defined as the financial expenses divided by the net 
borrowing. Amounts of tangible capital and turnover are expressed in thousands of euros. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
2.4.2. Descriptive statistics 
We have carried out the econometric analysis for the rankings with at least 10 treated and 10 non-
treated observations. Therefore we do not evaluate auctions in Basilicata and Molise (the smallest 
regions in our sample), the 2
nd
 auction in Sicily, and the 4
th
 auction in Abruzzi and Sardinia;
24
 
                                                 
23
 Furthermore, using Hotelling’s T-squared generalised means test, we have tested for differences in the means and the 
medians of a large set of financial variables in the aggregated dataset, finding no evidence of statistically significant 
differences between subsidised and non-subsidised firms “close” to the cut-off point. 
24
 In order to verify if the loss of these observations would substantially affect our results, we have tested whether the 
integration of these observations into the aggregated dataset significantly modifies the LATE estimates for each 
dependent variable. The results obtained support the hypothesis that the loss of these observations is not critical; in fact, 
the inclusion of such observations does not cause any statistically significant change in the LATE estimates. 
  Bandwidth 
Tangible 
capital 1995 
Turnover 
1995 
Productivity 
1995 
Employees 
1995 
Liabilities 
ratio 1995 
ROE 
1995 
T
ri
an
g
le
 
K
er
n
el
 
75% opt.bw -721.25 -1,733.30 11.53 -3.70 -0.08 5.02 
  (890.59) (1,637.59) (6.71)* (5.78) (0.24) (7.21) 
opt.bw -670.70 -1,232.65 8.88 -0.05 -0.09 4.35 
  (730.66) (1,542.58) (5.61) (5.52) (0.19) (6.82) 
150% opt.bw -337.87 -1,014.04 5.47 2.99 0.12 -0.79 
  (548.98) (1,295.44) (4.76) (5.10) (0.15) (6.30) 
E
p
an
ec
h
n
ik
o
v
 
K
er
n
el
 
75% opt.bw -103.99 -916.65 4.82 2.84 -0.14 -2.72 
  (491.07) (1,315.32) (4.16) (4.53) (0.14) (6.01) 
opt.bw -6.73 -900.21 4.65 1.87 -0.15 -3.62 
  (460.28) (1,307.98) (3.98) (4.47) (0.14) (6.06) 
150% opt.bw 3.30 -891.06 4.48 1.41 -0.15 -4.12 
  (454.18) (1,309.19) (4.07) (4.50) (0.13) (6.11) 
G
au
ss
ia
n
 
K
er
n
el
 
75% opt.bw 176.10 -992.88 5.21 2.62 -0.13 -1.45 
  (565.96) (1,347.44) (4.24) (3.54) (0.14) (7.54) 
opt.bw -71.58 -935.88 5.21 2.26 -0.14 -2.71 
  (496.26) (1,396.32) (4.38) (3.56) (0.13) (7.39) 
150% opt.bw -15.06 -903.42 4.57 1.73 -0.15 -3.67 
  (449.07) (1,322.52) (4.18) (3.66) (0.13) (7.32) 
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consequently, there are 15 rankings under analysis. We thoroughly describe the data in Appendix 
2.A. 
We now turn to a brief presentation of some descriptive statistics. The amount of resources 
allocated in the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, and 4
th
 auctions is roughly €6.5 billion, and of the 27,436 projects that 
overcame the preliminary screening, 11,722 obtained funding (42.7%). Among the subsidised 
projects, 65% of the firms are located in the Mezzogiorno, for a total of €5.58 billion allocated by 
L488 (86% of the total funding). 
Using the whole sample reconstructed for the short-term analysis we find that the two groups of 
firms are very similar in terms of age, ROE, and tangible capital, while financed firms have a higher 
turnover and are slightly larger (more employees).
25
 These statistics are reported in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics 
Bandwidth 
 Subsidised 
firms 
Non-subsidised 
firms 
Tangible capital 
  
Mean 1,784 2,132 
Median 390 380 
Turnover 
 
Mean 7,640 4,922 
Median 1,706 1,296 
Size (Nb. of employees) 
  
Mean 31.29 22.73 
Median 10 9 
Output per worker 
 
Mean 51.28 39.13 
Median 45.20 37.33 
ROE 
  
Mean 5.91 7.99 
Median 6.64 5.29 
Firm constitution Mean 1985 1985 
Median 1988 1988 
Note: The variables are reported for the pre-treatment year 1995. Amounts of 
tangible capital and turnover are expressed in thousands of euros. 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Graphical evidence 
The estimation procedure begins with some graphical evidence. A simple way to evaluate the effect 
of L488 is to plot the relationship between each outcome variable and the forcing variable for firms 
on either side of the cut-off point.
26
 Fifteen different rankings have been analysed with the MRDD 
and it is impractical to graphically represent all of them; therefore, we illustrate only the most 
representative (the ranking with the highest number of treated firms), i.e. Campania in the 2
nd
 
                                                 
25
 If we restrict the analysis to the observations “close” to the threshold as described in Section 2.3.3, these differences 
tail off and become statistically insignificant. 
26
 If there is no visual evidence of a discontinuity in the graph, it is unlikely that even the most sophisticated regression 
methods will yield a significant policy effect (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
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auction. Fig. 2.1 plots this ranking for each dependent variable for the period from 1995-2001 for 
subsidised firms against non-subsidised firms. In each graph, the cut-off line sharply separates the 
treated and not-treated firms. Each figure superimposes the fit of a nonparametric flexible 
polynomial regression model (estimated separately on each side of the cut-off point), together with 
the 95% confidence bands. 
Fig. 2.1 clearly shows that, on average, subsidised firms grow more than non-subsidised firms. To 
provide some graphical evidence for the entire merged dataset, in Fig. 2.2 we present the figures 
relative to the pooling approach in which we exploit all the available observations. This figure too 
displays a systematic difference between financed and non-financed firms in the aggregated sample 
for each dependent variable but productivity. 
2.5.2. Regression results 
The standard approach in the RDD analysis is to use a local linear regression, which minimises the 
bias of the estimates (see Hahn et al., 2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). There are two key issues in 
implementing the estimation by a local linear regression: the choice of the kernel and the choice of 
the bandwidth. Different types of kernels are available. We present our results using three different 
types: triangular, Epanechnikov, and Gaussian. 
A very delicate part of the analysis is the choice of the bandwidth. In a nonparametric RDD 
estimation, this involves finding an optimal balance between precision (more observations are 
available to estimate the regression) and bias (the larger the bandwidth, the larger the differences 
between treated and not-treated firms). There are several rule-of-thumb bandwidth choosers, but 
none are completely reliable. A recent contribution by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) presents a 
data-dependent method for choosing an asymptotically optimal bandwidth in the case of a RDD. 
However, different bandwidth choices are likely to produce different estimates. We have decided to 
report three estimates as an informal sensitivity test: the first uses the Imbens-Kalyanaraman 
formula (the optimal bandwidth); the others reduce the optimal bandwidth by 25% and increase the 
optimal bandwidth by 50%.
27
 Standard errors are estimated with a bootstrap procedure.
28
 The 
results are presented in Table 2.4 (see Nichols, 2011, for more details on the implementation of the 
RDD estimates and the Stata module rd.ado). 
                                                 
27 
These optimal bandwidths derive from a weighted procedure of the optimal bandwidths computed for each ranking; 
for this reason, they are not numerically reported in Table 2.4. 
28
 We used 200 repetitions in each procedure. 
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Fig. 2.1. Differences in investment, turnover, employment, and productivity at the discontinuity between 
subsidised and non-subsidised firms in Campania for the 2
nd
 auction. 
Note: Bin size=0.05. We use the Stata’s command lpolyci to superimpose the fit of a nonparametric flexible polynomial 
regression model, separately estimated on both sides of the cut-off point, together with 95% confidence bands. This 
graphical analysis has been carried out on the 134 observations having forcing variable values within the interval [-2; 
+2]. Amounts of cumulative investment are expressed in thousands of euros. 
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Fig. 2.2. Differences in investment, turnover, employment, and productivity at the discontinuity between 
subsidised and non-subsidised firms in the aggregated sample. 
Note: Bin size=0.01. We use the Stata’s command lpolyci to superimpose the fit of a nonparametric flexible polynomial 
regression model, separately estimated on both sides of the cut-off point, together with 95% confidence bands. This 
graphical analysis has been carried out on the 270 observations having forcing variable values within the interval [-0.4; 
+0.4]. Amounts of cumulative investment are expressed in thousands of euros. 
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The effect of the L488 policy is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level (for each kernel 
and for every bandwidth) for each dependent variable but productivity.
29
 Over the period from 
1995-2001, the tangible capital growth rate is considerably higher in subsidised firms growing each 
year 14 to 17% faster than in non-subsidised firms (columns 1 and 2) and approximately doubling 
with regard to the median tangible capital in non-subsidised firms (columns 3 and 4), while the 
yearly growth rate of turnover is as large as 6.5 to 8% higher in subsidised firms (columns 5 and 6). 
Also the impact of L488 on employment is positive: subsidised firms hire on average from 5 to 8 
extra employees in respect to non-subsidised firms (columns 7 and 8). On the contrary, there is 
some evidence that the impact on the output per worker is negligible or slightly negative (columns 9 
and 10).
30
 
2.5.2.1. Long-term analysis 
We conduct a long-term analysis especially in order to test the intertemporal substitution 
hypothesis. Fig. 2.3 displays the evolution of the differences in tangible capital (cumulative 
investment) between financed and non-financed firms for the period from 1995-2004, estimated 
each year with the RDD. The gap in cumulative investment between financed and non-financed 
firms markedly increases in the period from 1995 to 2001 and then slightly decreases in the 
following years. This gap becomes statistically significant since 1999 and remains in place until 
2004. Moreover, analysing the other dependent variables we find that turnover and especially 
cumulative investment markedly increased in the subsidised firms during the years of the subsidies, 
while after that period, they grew at approximately the same rate of the non-subsidised firms (see 
Fig. 2.B1 of Appendix 2.B). The joint evaluation of these results shows that we can safely reject the 
intertemporal substitution hypothesis. Also the employment level of subsidised firms considerably 
increased during the 9-year period, with estimates that become statistically significant in 2003, 
while the effect on productivity is mostly negligible. 
 
 
                                                 
29
 These results rely on the assumption that there are no other governmental programs correlated with the allocation of 
L488 funding. As shown in Section 2.2.2, a feature of L488 minimises the extent of this bias. 
30
 We also have results disaggregated by auction. Concerning cumulative investment and employment, the estimates 
show a positive effect of L488 for every auction, but this effect is statistically significant (at the 1% or 5% level) only 
for the 2
nd
 and the 4
th
 auction; similarly, the estimates about turnover show a positive effect of L488 for each auction, 
but this effect is statistically significant only for the 2
nd
 (at the 1% level) and the 4
th
 auction (at the 5% or 10% level). 
Finally, the productivity estimates are negligible or negative in the auctions considered but the negative estimates are 
statistically significant (at the 5% or 10% level) only for the 4
th
 auction. The lack of statistical significance in some 
auctions can be attributed to the smaller number of observations: in presence of high variability, as is common in firms’ 
performance analysis, the number of observations greatly influences the statistical significance of the estimates. 
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Fig. 2.3. Evolution of the difference between subsidised and non-subsidised firms’ 
cumulative investment during the period 1995-2004. 
Note: We carry out a local linear regression in each year from 1995-2004. We use only the 
573 non-duplicate firms composing the sample for the long-term evaluation. Amounts are 
expressed in thousands of euros. 
2.5.2.2 Cost per job and complementarity of the subsidised investment 
Some interesting parameters for analysing the effectiveness of a business incentive program are the 
estimation of the cost per job in terms of public expenditure and the evaluation of the possible 
spillovers of the subsidies on other investment activities of the subsidised firms.
31,32
 Dividing the 
average amount of the subsidies for firms located near the cut-off point by the MRDD estimates of 
the per-firm employment change we find that each additional new job has cost between €46,343 and 
€77,520.33 Clearly, such estimates do not take into account the possible spillovers (negative or 
positive) engendered by the policy. There is some evidence (see De Castris and Pellegrini, 2012; 
Essay 3) that the L488 funds have caused a small reduction in the employment level of non-
                                                 
31
 In this strand of literature the implementation of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is extremely complicated, 
especially because of the difficulties in performing a complete account of the costs and benefits of investment incentive 
programs. General equilibrium effects such as those due to distortions between subsidised and non-subsidised firms and 
the need for financing the subsidy with distortionary taxes are impossible to gauge using the counterfactual framework. 
Also the partial equilibrium costs and benefits expressed as the social return of investment incentives are difficult to 
retrieve. Such comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is beyond the scope of our paper. 
32
 The cost per job is, of course, far from a welfare calculation as we are not factoring in other distortions such as the 
dampening effect on aggregate productivity of keeping open the less productive firms. On the other hand, the 
government is also saving money from paying less out in unemployment benefits and other forms of welfare for 
workers who are drawn into employment (Criscuolo et al., 2012). 
33
 These figures are consistent with the nature of L488. Indeed, this program supports the private investment by 
reducing the cost of capital and the theoretical effect that this has on employment is unclear (see Schalk and Untiedt, 
2000; Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011). The policymakers have tried to contrast the substitution effect between capital and 
labour by adding “the new job creation by unit of investment” as one of the five criteria to determine the assignment of 
the L488 funds; however, our estimates are larger than those retrieved by Bondonio and Greenbaum (2014) and 
Criscuolo et al. (2012). 
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subsidised firms; this implies that the aforementioned figures somewhat underestimate the real cost 
per job of the program. 
The complementarity between the subsidised investment and the rest of the firms’ investment 
activities is evaluated by comparing the total investment response and the funds the government put 
into subsidised firms. An easy way to do so is evaluating the new investment net of the subsidy 
amount; therefore, we modify two of the dependent variables (yearly growth rate of tangible capital 
and cumulative investment from 1995-2001) subtracting from the tangible capital in 2001 the 
subsidy amount.  
Table 2.5: MRDD estimates (net subsidy) 
  
Dependent variable: 
yearly growth rate of 
tangible capital (net 
subsidy) 
 Dependent variable: 
cumulative investment 
from 1995-2001 (net 
subsidy) 
 
  Weighting schemes  Weighting schemes  
   
Number of 
firms close 
to the cut-off 
Inverse-
variance 
weighting 
 Number of 
firms close 
to the cut-off 
Inverse-
variance 
weighting 
 
 Bandwidth (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
T
ri
an
g
le
 
K
er
n
el
 
75% opt.bw 2.24 3.05  -83.23 65.89 
  (5.42) (4.94)  (268.11) (175.56) 
opt.bw 2.00 2.99  -13.67 86.19 
  (4.32) (3.99)  (229.27) (150.37) 
150% opt.bw 2.88 2.92  -10.61 34.48 
  (3.63) (3.38)  (176.43) (131.83) 
E
p
an
ec
h
n
ik
o
v
 
K
er
n
el
 
75% opt.bw 2.67 1.47  4.10 5.72 
  (3.58) (3.44)  (165.14) (136.05) 
opt.bw 1.47 1.12  24.21 15.74 
  (3.32) (3.24)  (159.92) (131.52) 
150% opt.bw 0.65 0.95  22.35 20.11 
  (3.20) (3.10)  (158.02) (127.78) 
G
au
ss
ia
n
 
K
er
n
el
 
75% opt.bw 2.08 1.55  -5.28 38.87 
  (3.48) (3.32)  (166.91) (130.46) 
opt.bw 1.58 1.15  5.97 32.38 
  (3.30) (3.19)  (158.53) (127.05) 
150% opt.bw 0.98 0.86  12.60 37.79 
  (3.19) (3.09)  (154.52)  (124.78) 
Note: Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parentheses. Formulae (2.5) and (2.6) are used to 
compute the estimates of the number of firms close to the cut-off weighting scheme, 
while we use formulae (2.7) and (2.8) for the inverse-variance weighting scheme. The 
interval ± bandwidth chosen for the nonparametric analysis in the aggregated sample is 
±1.72. 959 firms (56.3% of the sample) have forcing variable values within this interval 
(428 treated and 531 not treated). The net subsidy dependent variables are obtained 
subtracting from the tangible capital in 2001 the subsidy amount that treated firms 
received. Amounts of cumulative investment are expressed in thousands of euros.  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
The results are reported in Table 2.5 and show that the tangible capital growth rate net of the 
subsidy amount is positive but not statistically significant (columns 1 and 2), while the growth in 
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cumulative investment from 1995-2001 net of the subsidy amount is approximately nil (columns 3 
and 4). These results are not surprising: the owners’ financial resources invested by subsidised firms 
are basically equal to the owners’ financial resources invested by non-financed firms. Such analysis 
points to the absence of complementarity between the subsidised investment and the rest of the 
firms’ investment activities; nevertheless, this does not mean that there are no benefits: the 
additional capital stock accumulated in subsidised firms is expected to generate income and wealth 
over time. 
Our analysis does not consider the presence of possible spillovers among firms. Therefore, our 
results crucially depend on the validity of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), 
i.e. we assume that interactions among firms are irrelevant in generating firms’ potential outcomes 
(see Rubin, 1986). A recent empirical literature has overcome some of the SUTVA’s limitations and 
estimated the spillover effects of investment incentive policies (see De Castris and Pellegrini, 2012; 
Essay 3). The evidence points to spillovers which are mostly negligible in terms of investment and 
turnover and small but negative in terms of employment. On the whole, these results suggest that 
our main findings on tangible capital and turnover remain substantially unchanged, while we should 
be cautious in claiming a positive impact of the policy on employment in the eligible areas. 
2.5.2.3. Is the effect of investment incentives independent of the firm size? 
Several papers note that the effects of the subsidies are highly heterogeneous across firm size (see, 
e.g., Adorno et al., 2007; Criscuolo et al., 2012). We can gain insight into these effects even with a 
straightforward application of the RDD using the aggregated dataset.
34
 Using only small firms, the 
effect on the growth rate of tangible capital (turnover) is roughly 75% (30%) larger than the MRDD 
estimates, while the effect on employment is basically unchanged with respect to the estimates in 
Table 2.4. Repeating the same procedure for large firms, we obtain estimates considerably lower 
than those obtained with the MRDD and statistically significant only for the tangible capital.
35
 From 
this straightforward analysis, we find that the effect of subsidies on the growth rates is markedly 
larger for small firms. Considering that our sample is skewed towards large firms, a plausible 
explanation is that we are potentially underestimating our growth rate estimates that can be 
                                                 
34
 We have tested that the main RDD assumptions are confirmed for these subsamples. 
35
 Small and large firms are defined as firms below and above the median of the firm turnover in 1995, respectively. 
Similar results are achieved using sales and cost of labour as discriminating variables, while changing the 
discriminating points of these variables modifies the results in the expected direction (the fewer firms that are 
considered large, the lower are the extent of the estimates for those firms). These results are in Table 2.B1 of Appendix 
2.B. 
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interpreted as a lower bound of the actual LATE.
36
 The effect on productivity is heterogeneous by 
size but by and large it is still not statistically significant.
37
 
2.6. Robustness proofs 
2.6.1. Robustness tests with the aggregated dataset 
A robustness analysis is carried out comparing the MRDD results with the results obtained through 
the pooling approach. Because we focus on the average treatment effect of subsidies on firms 
ranked around the cut-off point, for this analysis, we use only the closest observations to the 
threshold (25% of the sample). The nonparametric estimates, reported in Table 2.6, are similar to 
the results obtained with the MRDD. The difference between the two groups of firms is 19-21% for 
the yearly growth rate of tangible capital, 10-11% for the yearly growth rate of turnover, 500-650 
thousands of euros for the cumulative investment, and 7 workers for the per-firm employment 
change, while the impact on productivity is negligible. 
Table 2.6: RDD robustness estimates 
 
 
Kernel 
Yearly growth 
rate of tangible 
capital 
Cumulative 
investment from 
1995-2001 
Yearly growth 
rate of turnover 
1995–2001 per-
firm employment 
change 
Output per 
worker in 2001 
Triangle 21.55 661.69 11.43 7.36 1.21 
(6.72)*** (329.52)** (4.59)** (3.97)* (11.60) 
Epanech. 19.60 518.38 10.15 6.83 -1.07 
(4.96)*** (257.24)** (3.82)*** (3.36)** (6.91) 
Gaussian 20.97 524.44 10.12 6.97 -0.82 
(5.22)*** (261.08)** (4.01)** (3.25)** (7.02) 
Note: Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parentheses. The estimates are based on the 25% of the sample closest to 
the normalised cut-off point (keeping constant the percentage of financed firms in the sample). We use only the 
optimal bandwidth. Amounts of cumulative investment are expressed in thousands of euros. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
The results of the parametric RDD,
38
 adding different polynomials and interaction terms, are in 
Table 2.B2 of Appendix 2.B. In all these cases, the BIC and the AIC criteria choose the simplest 
                                                 
36
 This result is consistent with the empirical evidence that small firms are more prone to financial distress and credit 
crunches. Moreover, the EU rules favour smaller firms in terms of the share of the subsidies applicable in respect of the 
project value. Another interpretation is presented in the theoretical model proposed by Criscuolo et al. (2012), 
suggesting that the larger effect on smaller firms is due to larger firms being more able to “game” the system and take 
the subsidy without changing their investment and employment levels. Finally, another possible explanation is that large 
firms ask for an amount of subsidies that is not directly proportional to their dimensions, so that they would need much 
more money in order to grow proportionally as much as the smaller firms. 
37
 In a few cases this effect is positive and statistically significant for the larger firms. This could be due to the higher 
than average capital intensity of the subsidised investment of these firms. 
38
 Lee and Lemieux (2010) argue that, in the case of polynomial regressions, the equivalent to bandwidth choice in the 
nonparametric regression is the choice of the order of the polynomial regressions. Therefore, it is advisable to try to 
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specification, i.e. a comparison of each dependent variable on the two sides of the cut-off point. The 
effect on productivity is negligible, while the effect on the other dependent variables is positive, 
statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level, equal to 15% for the yearly growth rate of tangible 
capital, 6.3% for the yearly growth rate of turnover, 638 thousands of euros for the cumulative 
investment, and 4.44 workers for the per-firm employment change.
39
 
2.6.2. Additional robustness tests 
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we assess the validity and the robustness of our results 
adopting various specification tests. First, we rule out possible discontinuities in the conditional 
density of the forcing variable (the score of the project in the regional ranking), which would 
indicate evidence of manipulation in the subsidies assignment. The McCrary test (McCrary, 2008) 
turns out to be negative for each ranking. In Fig. 2.4 we graphically present the negative results of 
this test in the Campania’s rankings, while the remaining 12 McCrary tests are reported in Fig. 2.B2 
of Appendix 2.B. Additionally, we exclude that each dependent variable is discontinuous at other 
values of the forcing variable (different from the cut-off), using different bandwidths (see Table 
2.7). We also control for possible jumps in the value of other exogenous covariates (liabilities ratio 
in 1995 and ROE in 1995) at the cut-off point of each ranking, using the MRDD, to be sure that the 
discontinuities close to the thresholds are caused by the treatment. Overall, we do not detect any 
statistically significant discontinuities as reported in Table 2.2 (columns 5 and 6).
 
Accordingly, all 
these robustness tests confirm that the L488 selection process has been carried out without 
significant irregularities.
40
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
report a number of specifications to see to what extent the results are sensitive to the order of the polynomial. The 
choice of the order of the polynomial is assessed using a goodness-of-fit criterion. 
39
 Analysing with the same procedure the sample for the long-term evaluation, we find that in the period from 1995 to 
2004 the long-term effect on all the dependent variables but productivity is positive, statistically significant at the 5% 
level equal to 8.2%, 5.3%, 494 thousands of euros, and 6.47 workers, respectively, for the yearly growth rate of tangible 
capital, the yearly growth rate of turnover, the cumulative investment from 1995-2004, and the per-firm employment 
change from 1995-2004. 
40
 These robustness tests are not the only reason why we argue for the absence of significant irregularities. Indeed, 
considering the possibility of collusion among applicants, we argue that the large number of participants in each 
considered “call for tender” makes far-fetched any hypothesis of collusive behaviour. On the other side, an internal 
study at the Ministry of Economic Development shows that only 3.6% of the subsidised projects represented cases of 
possible corruption, i.e. the projects that were revoked because of a lack of requirements with some evidence of a 
fraudulent behaviour. Therefore, we cannot exclude the presence of some cases of corruption but this phenomenon 
should be limited to a physiological level. 
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Fig. 2.4. McCrary test for Campania in each auction. 
Note: This test is based on an estimator for the discontinuity at the cut-off in the density function of the forcing 
variable. The test is implemented as a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the discontinuity is zero. 
Table 2.7. Test of different cut-off points of the forcing variables for each dependent variable 
Note: Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parentheses. We carry out all the estimates using the local linear regression with 
the triangular kernel. We use all the 1,356 non-duplicate firms (560 subsidised, 796 non-subsidised) of the dataset for 
the short-term analysis. Amounts of cumulative investment are expressed in thousands of euros. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Dependent variable  Bandwidth 
Cut-off point 
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 
Yearly growth rate 
of tangible capital 
75% opt.bw 
9.15 -3.21 3.02 17.99 -4.16 -5.42 3.23 
(5.32)* (4.76) (4.90) (4.20)*** (5.11) (4.52) (6.49) 
opt.bw 
7.41 -5.68 4.24 17.33 -5.93 -6.28 2.54 
(4.73) (4.01) (4.39) (3.64)*** (4.36) (4.03) (5.36) 
150% opt.bw 
6.61 -5.49 4.77 16.59 -4.47 -6.76 -1.27 
(4.25) (3.71) (3.63) (3.15)*** (3.64) (3.68)* (4.58) 
Cumulative 
investment from 
1995-2001 
75% opt.bw 
-47.82 149.40 -8.86 665.40 -199.42 -371.29 85.81 
(262.35) (221.27) (199.87) (212.42)*** (242.91) (249.98) (303.14) 
opt.bw 
-119.06 117.60 140.83 695.14 -207.04 -393.83 -6.85 
(229.6) (190.53) (175.8) (178.88)*** (213.27) (226.08)* (270.46) 
150% opt.bw 
-167.31 -127.97 194.08 661.87 -159.84 -377.48 -287.45 
(185.87) (167.41) (148.37) (146.09)*** (190.1) (191.52)** (235.56) 
Yearly growth rate 
of turnover 
75% opt.bw 
3.73 -3.63 -0.07 8.91 -2.44 1.56 7.95 
(4.45) (2.72) (2.54) (2.88)*** (3.65) (3.77) (4.67)* 
opt.bw 
3.56 -4.16 0.51 9.34 -2.40 0.32 6.73 
(3.90) (2.42)* (2.35) (2.47)*** (3.11) (3.42) (3.95)* 
150% opt.bw 
2.36 -3.32 1.09 8.43 -1.25 -1.65 5.72 
(3.03) (2.07) (2.09) (2.02)*** (2.67) (2.89) (3.58) 
1995–2001 per-firm 
employment change 
75% opt.bw 
-3.30 2.85 2.72 6.12 -4.75 0.10 1.35 
(2.68) (2.87) (2.13) (3.17)* (3.33) (3.10) (4.61) 
opt.bw 
-4.17 0.85 2.59 5.87 -3.67 0.47 -0.06 
(2.27)* (2.55) (1.89) (2.68)** (2.83) (2.93) (4.07) 
150% opt.bw 
-3.44 -0.13 2.35 6.34 -1.70 -0.70 -3.03 
(1.88)* (2.16) (1.69) (2.23)*** (2.33) (2.67) (3.57) 
Output per worker 
2001 
75% opt.bw 
8.06 -7.62 2.64 -2.13 6.05 1.85 -6.64 
(5.44) (4.98) (6.83) (4.87) (3.90) (4.39) (4.84) 
opt.bw 
7.11 -7.19 5.00 -1.42 5.89 2.34 -5.74 
(4.57) (4.05)* (5.98) (4.15) (3.19)* (3.81) (4.29) 
150% opt.bw 
6.60 -5.94 1.51 -1.85 4.66 2.88 -3.17 
(3.71)* (3.37)* (4.54) (3.45) (2.89)* (3.39) (3.59) 
Nb. obs. on the left of the cut-off 501 607 714 796 971 1103 1190 
Nb. obs. on the right of the cut-off 855 749 642 560 385 353 166 
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2.7. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to develop a reliable approach to evaluate the causal effect of public 
subsidies to investment in lagging regions. Our analysis focuses on the impact of L488 on 
cumulative investment, turnover, employment, and productivity in a nonparametric RDD 
framework. We take advantage of the quasi-experimental procedure indicated by the RDD to 
exploit the discontinuity points of the forcing variable, created by the auction mechanism of L488. 
Subsequent to an accurate and complex process of merging, we use the RDD for each region in 
each of the auctions analysed; afterwards, the estimates are aggregated and weighted through the 
MRDD. 
The results suggest that the policy has boosted private capital accumulation in subsidised firms. 
Over the period 1995-2001, tangible capital and turnover growth rates and employment are 
considerably higher in subsidised firms. At the end of the period, the subsidised firms’ tangible 
capital approximately doubles with respect to the median tangible capital in non-subsidised firms 
and this is not due to intertemporal substitution. These estimates are statistically significant and 
robust to different weighting schemes, bandwidths and kernels. The positive impact of subsidies on 
firms’ growth and the negligible impact on productivity are also consistent with most of the 
international literature based on different evaluation strategies. 
The effects of L488 are in line with at least one of the policymakers’ targets: subsidised firms have 
invested more than they usually would have, and the additionality of the investment is confirmed by 
analysing the cumulative investment growth net of the subsidy amount. The additional capital stock 
accumulated is expected to generate income and wealth in the subsidised regions over time; this is 
why capital incentives are considered a policy instrument for territorial development. We find also 
that the output effect of subsidies on employment is greater than the substitution effect; however, 
this is not a policy primarily meant to increase employment in the area. For instance, the average 
cost per job created by the policy is higher with respect to other instruments more focused on the 
employment target. 
The increase in capital stock does not necessarily entail efficient and productive subsidised firms as 
shown by the negligible impact of L488 on the output per worker. Such result might derive from the 
assignment criteria that reward projects with a high number of new employees by unit of 
investment. In fact, firms are induced to overshoot the optimal amount of employment in order to 
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gain the subsidy but this behaviour can affect long run efficiency and growth.
41
 The effect of L488 
on the competitiveness of subsidised firms in the global economy is an interesting topic left for 
future research. 
  
                                                 
41
 For a deeper discussion of the impact of L488 on productivity see Bernini and Pellegrini (2011). 
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Appendix 2.A. Data description 
The initial subsidised firms group consisted of all the financed projects according to the rankings 
under analysis. Projects were eligible for the control group if they were admitted to the evaluation 
for the regional auctions but were not financed. After the merging procedure (using VAT 
identification number as firm identifier), the total number of firms under analysis was 2,881 (748 
firms for the 2
nd
 auction, 1,243 firms for the 3
rd
 auction and 890 firms for the 4
th
 auction). We then 
proceeded with the removal of certain categories of observations: 
- Concerning duplicate projects, i.e. applications for more than one auction, we have decided to 
exclude the non-financed projects if the referring firm received the grant in another auction (in 
this case, the financed project was added to the treated group); on the other hand, we have opted 
to keep such projects inside the control group if the referring firm was never subsidised. 
- Start-ups because their pre-treatment balance sheets are obviously not available. 
- Projects that presented anomalies and irregularities.42 
- Financed projects whose investment program was not yet concluded. 
- All the projects started (or scheduled to start) after 1999. This choice is motivated by the 
impossibility of evaluating these projects because they were missing a sufficient temporal lag 
with project information after their conclusion. 
- Projects pertaining to rankings that did not fulfil the pre-requisite of at least 10 subsidised and 10 
non-subsidised observations.
43
 
After verifying that the cleaning and integration procedures do not have a different impact on 
financed projects and the control group, our attention focused on the final dataset on which the 
evaluation model was implemented. This dataset consists of 560 financed projects and 1,144 non-
financed projects (796 if we consider only non-duplicate firms) over the period 1995-2001. The 
composition of the merged dataset is in Table 2.A1.
44
 
 
                                                 
42
 We have decided to exclude from the analysis the subsidised firms from which the Ministry of Economic 
Development has revoked more than 25% of the L488 funds. 
43
 We have excluded 280 observations for this reason: Abruzzi in the 4
th
 auction (6 treated and 41 non-treated firms); 
Basilicata in the 2
nd
 auction (6 treated and 21 non-treated firms); Basilicata in the 3
rd
 auction (8 treated and 33 non-
treated firms); Basilicata in the 4
th
 auction (4 treated and 16 non-treated firms); Molise in the 2
nd
 auction (2 treated and 
9 non-treated firms); Molise in the 3
rd
 auction (1 treated and 7 non-treated firms); Molise in the 4
th
 auction (2 treated 
and 3 non-treated firms); Sardinia in the 4
th
 auction (4 treated and 40 non-treated firms); and Sicily in the 2
nd
 auction 
(76 treated and 1 non-treated firms).  
44
 Before carrying out the analyses, we used a truncation method, wherein extreme values (observations in the first two 
and last two centiles) are recoded to lowest or highest reasonable values (the value of the 2
nd
 centile and the value of the 
98
th
 centile, respectively) to the relative dependent variable. 
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Table 2.A1. Composition of the merged dataset 
 Auction 2  Auction 3  Auction 4  Global 
Regions 
Subsidised  Subsidised  Subsidised  Subsidised 
NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES 
Abruzzi 54 26  82 15  - -  136 41 
Calabria 19 23  39 17  23 11  81 51 
Campania 37 133  183 49  126 42  346 224 
Puglia 44 79  167 41  88 36  299 156 
Sardinia 18 17  39 10  - -  57 27 
Sicily - -  120 24  103 37  223 61 
 172 278  630 156  340 126  1,142 560 
Note: We have carried out the econometric analysis for the rankings with at least 
10 treated and 10 non-treated observations. For this reason, we do not report the 
sample size for the auctions in Basilicata and Molise, in Sicily for the 2
nd
 
auction, and in Abruzzi and Sardinia for the 4
th
 auction. 
The sample for the long-term evaluation (1995-2004) consists of 239 financed projects and 470 
non-financed projects (334 if we consider only non-duplicate firms). The decrease in the number of 
firms in the sample is mainly due to misprints (the merging process has been reiterated for each 
year in the period from 1995 to 2004), the unavailability of balance sheet data over the entire 
period, the closure or merging of some firms in the period from 2002-2004, and the presence of 
firms that received the L488 subsidies during the period from 2002-2004 (the presence of these 
firms in the sample for the long-term analysis would have biased the estimates). 
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Appendix 2.B. Additional tables and figures 
Fig. 2.B1  presents  plots  of  the  evolution  of  the  difference  between  financed  and non-financed  
firms  with  respect  to  each  dependent  variable  but  cumulative  investment,  which  is presented 
separately in Fig. 2.3, for the period from 1995-2004. 
Fig. 2.B2 graphically reports the McCrary tests for all the rankings but those concerning Campania 
(reported separately in Fig. 2.4). 
Table 2.B1 presents the RDD estimates using the pooling approach when we split the dataset in two 
halves according to the median dimension of the firms in 1995. 
Table 2.B2 shows the results of the parametric RDD using a polynomial order up to 2. 
 
Fig. 2.B1. Evolution of the difference between financed and non-financed firms with respect to investment, 
turnover, employment, and productivity during the period 1995-2004. 
Note: We carry out a local linear regression in each year from 1995-2004. We use only the 573 non-duplicate firms 
composing the sample for the long-term evaluation. The figure for cumulative investment is reported separately in Fig. 
2.3.  
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Fig. 2.B2. McCrary test for the analysed rankings (except Campania). 
Note: This test is based on an estimator for the discontinuity at the cut-off in the density 
function of the forcing variable. The test is implemented as a Wald test of the null hypothesis 
that the discontinuity is zero. Figures for Campania are reported separately in Fig. 2.4. 
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Table 2.B1. Heterogeneity in the impact of L488 in respect to firm size 
Note: Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parentheses. Small and large firms are defined as firms below and above the 
median of the firm turnover in 1995, respectively. The estimates are based on the 25% of the sample closest to the 
normalised cut-off point (keeping constant the percentage of financed firms in the sample). Using only half of this 
shortened sample means that we use only the 12.5% of the sample for each of these analyses. We use only the optimal 
bandwidth. Amounts of cumulative investment are expressed in thousands of euros. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
Table 2.B2. Parametric estimates of each dependent variable 
Dependent variable: yearly growth rate of tangible capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment effect 15.14 17.90 21.33 22.53 20.99 
(standard error) (2.70)*** (5.23)*** (6.05)*** (6.90)*** (8.72)** 
Polynomial order 0 1 1 2 2 
Interaction term - - -27.15 - -32.45 
(standard error)   (21.11)  (79.41) 
Interaction term squared - - - - 4.74 
(standard error)     (19.35) 
R-squared  0.0903 0.0914 0.0965 0.0946 0.0965 
RMSE  0.2375 0.2377 0.2374 0.2377 0.2378 
AIC  -10.50 -8.92 -8.80 -8.08 -5.81 
BIC  -2.86 -2.54 -2.48 7.20 17.13 
Nb. of treated 140 140 140 140 140 
Nb. of controls 199 199 199 199 199 
Dependent variable: cumulative investment from 1995-2001 
Treatment effect 638.71 546.44 512.68 553.61 593.37 
(standard error) (142.17)*** (243.95)** (293.68)* (317.57)* (347.91)* 
Polynomial order 0 1 1 2 2 
Interaction term - - 394.07 - 740.20 
(standard error)   (1,237.3)  (1,875.73) 
Interaction term squared - - - - -1,335.57 
(standard error)     (3,781.25) 
R-squared  0.0639 0.0644 0.0646 0.0644 0.0655 
RMSE  1208.3 1209.7 1211.4 1211.6 1219.3 
AIC  5,741.69 5,743.51 5,745.44 5,745.51 5,781.27 
BIC  5,749.33 5,754.97 5,760.72 5,760.79 5,804.21 
Nb. of treated 140 140 140 140 140 
Nb. of controls 199 199 199 199 199 
 
Size of the 
firms 
Yearly growth 
rate of tangible 
capital 
Cumulative 
investment from 
1995-2001 
Yearly growth 
rate of turnover 
1995–2001 per-
firm employment 
change 
Output per 
worker in 2001 
T
ri
an
g
le
 
K
er
n
el
 small 29.38 740.58 14.18 7.53 -19.58 
  (6.72)*** (182.55)*** (5.30)*** (3.09)** (14.64) 
medium-large 14.05 301.65 2.49 5.87 24.05 
(7.71)* (526.21) (4.93) (12.71) (15.27) 
E
p
an
ec
h
. 
K
er
n
el
 small 26.42 548.75 13.40 5.96 -12.83 
  (6.32)*** (131.83)*** (4.95)*** (1.84)*** (9.91) 
medium-large 11.70 417.58 4.10 4.42 20.89 
(6.83)* (368.53) (4.85) (7.08) (11.59)* 
G
au
ss
ia
n
 
K
er
n
el
 small 27.80 565.67 13.46 6.06 -14.15 
  (6.14)*** (125.46)*** (4.31)*** (2.04)*** (9.34) 
medium-large 12.78 398.32 3.50 4.21 21.37 
(6.42)** (361.77) (4.67) (7.56) (10.48)** 
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Dependent variable: yearly growth rate of turnover 
Treatment effect 6.29 8.79 10.28 10.56 9.83 
(standard error) (1.88)*** (3.59)** (4.45)** (5.26)** (6.99) 
Polynomial order 0 1 1 2 2 
Interaction term - - -11.82 - -21.69 
(standard error)   (16.34)  (61.70) 
Interaction term squared - - - - 14.08 
(standard error)     (97.89) 
R-squared  0.0356 0.0377 0.0398 0.0387 0.0401 
RMSE  0.1620 0.1620 0.1621 0.1622 0.1624 
AIC  -268.61 -267.35 -266.11 -265.71 -263.51 
BIC  -260.97 -255.88 -250.83 -250.43 -240.57 
Nb. of treated 140 140 140 140 140 
Nb. of controls 199 199 199 199 199 
Dependent variable: 1995–2001 per-firm employment change 
Treatment effect 4.44 5.10 7.20 7.91 6.56 
(standard error) (1.85)** (2.34)** (3.52)** (4.26)* (3.47)* 
Polynomial order 0 1 1 2 2 
Interaction term - - -11.90 - 8.66 
(standard error)   (14.01)  (23.87) 
Interaction term squared - - - - -32.42 
(standard error)     (78.47) 
R-squared  0.0174 0.0176 0.0218 0.0201 0.0229 
RMSE  16.485 16.508 16.498 16.512 16.538 
AIC  2,855.65 2,857.60 2,858.16 2,858.72 2,861.78 
BIC  2,863.30 2,869.07 2,873.45 2,874.02 2,884.72 
Nb. of treated 140 140 140 140 140 
Nb. of controls 199 199 199 199 199 
Dependent variable: output per worker in 2001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment effect -0.66 -4.98 -5.29 -1.64 8.05 
(standard error) (2.84) (5.62) (6.85) (8.03) (11.49) 
Polynomial order 0 1 1 2 2 
Interaction term - - 2.55 - -37.93 
(standard error)   (21.33)  (71.07) 
Interaction term squared - - - - 165.26 
(standard error)     (212.20) 
R-squared  0.0238 0.0271 0.0280 0.0411 0.0495 
RMSE  25.48 25.49 25.53 25.51 25.43 
AIC  3,066.21 3,067.39 3,069.36 3,068.87 3,068.96 
BIC  3,073.81 3,078.76 3,084.54 3,084.05 3,091.74 
Nb. of treated 140 140 140 140 140 
Nb. of controls 199 199 199 199 199 
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimates are based on the 25% of 
the sample closest to the normalised cut-off point (keeping constant the percentage of subsidised firms 
in the sample).The order of the polynomial is 0 if we do not add to the regression the forcing variable, 
whereas is 1 when we add the forcing variable, and 2 when we also add the squared of the forcing 
variable. The interaction term (squared) is given by the multiplication of the treatment dummy with the 
forcing variable (squared). Amounts of cumulative investment are expressed in thousands of euros. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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3. Beyond the SUTVA: how policy evaluations change when we allow 
for interactions among firms 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
For a long time the expression “industrial policy” has been on most economists’ lips. The long and 
heated debate on this topic, documented in Aiginger (2007) and Chang (2011), calls for a boost in 
the policy evaluators’ contribution on answering two crucial questions: is the government 
intervention justified? In this case, what policies work? This paper does not directly answer these 
general questions, but rather evaluates the effectiveness of a subgroup of industrial policies aiming 
to enhance the development of lagging regions.
1
 Developed countries have used several place-based 
policies
2
 to address the socioeconomic underdevelopment of these regions ranging from tax 
exemptions to soft loans. Such place-based policies are usually adopted in order to attract new 
investment, to decrease the unemployment level and, ultimately, to generate self-sustaining growth 
in lagging regions. One of the most popular policies in the EU to boost depressed regions’ growth 
consists in investment subsidies to private firms.
3
 This policy is typically selective and provides 
financial assistance to the eligible firms with investment projects that better meet policymakers’ 
targets. The empirical evidence to date is mixed and there is no general consensus on the 
effectiveness of such policy (see Essay 1). The great extent of evaluation works have focused on the 
policy impact on subsidised firms with respect to output, investment and employment, while the 
possible spillovers on other firms have been mostly overlooked. This is because most studies rely 
on the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), i.e. they assume away any possible 
interactions among firms due to the policy (see Rubin, 1986). There are several situations in which 
this assumption is not plausible; however, severe empirical difficulties in disentangling the spillover 
effects from more relevant confounding factors have hindered the relaxation of the SUTVA. 
 
 
                                                             
1 Defined here as regions with per capita GDP substantially below the country average and/or regions with output and 
employment levels well below the country average. 
2 Place-based programmes target public resources towards disadvantaged geographic areas rather than towards 
disadvantaged individuals as the people-based policies (see Barca et al., 2012). 
3 Henceforth, we will refer to this industrial policy using the expressions investment subsidy policies or business 
incentive programmes. 
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A strongly related matter is described in Bondonio (2009: 5): 
In principle, business incentive programmes of all sorts are somehow capable of affecting 
distant outcomes, such as macro-economic or long-run indicators of the well-being of 
residents measured at the level of the entire provinces, regions, or states in which eligible 
firms are located. In the vast majority of cases, however, the economic importance of the 
group of assisted firms, compared to the size of the province/region/state economy in which 
they are located is very little. As a result, any actual programme impact (in the form of a 
positive impulse given to the province/region/state economy) becomes virtually undetectable 
from the changes to the outcome variable of the evaluation caused by many confounding 
factors (including, in many cases, the presence of other business incentive programmes) of a 
much greater importance than the possible programme-induced improvements in the 
economic activity of the assisted firms. 
This valuable insight underlies the impossibility to accurately determine the macro effect of an 
investment subsidy programme; yet, evaluators should keep in mind that one of the founding 
rationales of such policy consists in generating positive externalities, such as a general improvement 
of the eligible areas’ socioeconomic situation. Thus, policy evaluators should strive for detecting 
potential spillovers turning to evaluation strategies that use firms as units (micro effects) instead of 
local areas (macro effects). Indeed, even if any actual programme impact is virtually undetectable at 
the province/region/state level, this does not entail that it is impossible to detect the indirect effect 
that the policy has on new entrants or eligible but unsubsidised firms. 
Traditional industrial policy analyses - i.e. all the analyses that rely on the SUTVA - put a lot of 
effort in facing selection bias issues; however, this comes at a price: such studies completely put 
aside the identification problems linked to spillover effects. Moreover, some of the traditional 
analyses identify the unsubsidised firms located in the vicinity of the subsidised firms as those firms 
with the most similar features in respect to the treatment group; nevertheless, in presence of 
spillovers, even a perfect control of selection bias will not suffice to prevent biased ATT estimates. 
Indeed, if some control units undergo policy spillovers they will not be suitable to be used as part of 
the control group, unless perfect knowledge about how spillovers spread is assumed and dealt with. 
For instance, in case of negative spillover effects on unsubsidised firms located in the vicinity of 
one or more subsidised firms belonging to the same sector of activity, traditional analyses will 
deliver an overestimate of the ATT even when selection bias is completely absent. 
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Potentially, investment subsidy programmes give rise to many externalities, such as agglomeration 
effects, the cross-sectional substitution and the crowding-out of non-subsidised firms. In principle, 
policy evaluators should try to inform the policymakers on the extent of each externality but, as we 
will show in Section 3.3, it is possible to single out each spillover only resorting to extremely strong 
assumptions. This is why we adopt a less stringent set of assumptions to retrieve two aggregate 
spillover parameters: i) the Average Spillover effect on the Affected (ASA) contrasts the positive 
agglomeration effect on unsubsidised firms with the cross-sectional substitution; and ii) the Average 
Spillover effect on the New Entrants (ASNE) contrasts the positive agglomeration effect on the new 
entrants with the crowding-out effect. 
Therefore, we clearly distinguish 3 different parameters: the ATT, the ASA and the ASNE, 
denoting as “welfare computation” the comprehensive evaluation of the industrial policy that 
originates from the combined assessment of the 3 parameters. In our application on an Italian 
industrial policy, the welfare computation suggests that capital subsidies engender a growth process 
of subsidised firms in terms of investment and employment. However, the positive effect on 
employment for subsidised firms is mitigated by the negative spillover effect on the affected 
untreated firms with at least 1 treated firm belonging to the same sector of activity located within a 
1 mile distance. 
This is not the first paper trying to take into account business incentive policy spillovers, in fact, 
also Criscuolo et al. (2012) and De Castris and Pellegrini (2012) face this challenging task. 
However, the present paper is the first to carry out the estimation of the micro spillover effects 
thanks to a novel evaluation strategy that partially relaxes the SUTVA. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the rationales for investment 
subsidy policies and their potential spillovers with a small survey on other studies concerning 
industrial policies’ spillovers. The welfare computation parameters are discussed in Section 3.3, 
followed in Section 3.4 by a presentation on how to partially relax the SUTVA. We then turn to the 
empirical application in Section 3.5, while Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2. Rationales for investment subsidy policies and their potential spillovers 
Distressed areas are among the most pressing policymakers’ concerns not only in developing 
countries - where regional inequalities can be striking - but also in developed nations.
4
 Indeed, most 
                                                             
4 At a broad level, the Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states: “the Union shall aim 
at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least 
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governments have tried to reduce regional inequalities resorting to a number of place-based policies 
(e.g., EU countries have been financing the EU Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund). 
Developed nations have spent large amounts of money for their state aid instruments;
5
 in particular, 
the EU has spent €13.6 billion for the 2007-13 programming period (Barca, 2009) for enterprise 
support policies. Why is that, i.e. what are the rationales behind business incentive programmes? 
Policymakers facing with distressed areas primarily try to reduce underdevelopment in a growth-
enhancing way.
6
 Some of them consider business incentive programmes useful to this purpose for 
two reasons. First, inefficient lock-ins of firms location and development can potentially be 
overcome and a shift to a more efficient equilibrium be induced through competition in capital 
subsidies. An inefficient lock-in pertains if, for historical accident or other reasons, an inferior 
stable equilibrium is chosen (Borck et al., 2012). The presence of a discontinuity in the changes 
needed to move towards a more efficient equilibrium calls for an external intervention. Investment 
subsidy policies are seen as a way to trigger endogenous changes and generate a self-sustaining 
growth that will maximise the development potential of low-income regions. This means that 
business incentive policies are not only expected to improve the economic situation of subsidised 
firms but also to generate a virtuous circle that will benefit unsubsidised firms. Furthermore, 
drawing on the firms’ location literature (e.g. Devereux et al., 2007), we argue that an improved 
local economy may facilitate the opening of new firms. In the long run, this process might beget 
enough critical mass giving rise to agglomerations in depressed areas.
7
 In order to make clearer and 
simplify the empirical spillover analysis, in the remainder of the paper we will distinguish between 
the positive agglomeration effects on unsubsidised firms and the positive agglomeration effects on 
new entrants.
8
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
favoured regions”. In the period 2007-2013, a substantial share of the EU budget - around 36 per cent (€347 billion) - is 
aimed at this purpose. The majority of EU Regional Policy funds, known as the Structural Funds and the Cohesion 
Fund, targets the most disadvantaged European regions, identified on the basis of EU statistical indicators and criteria 
(Pellegrini et al., 2012). 
5 Ulltveit-Moe (2008) divides these tools into six categories: grants, tax deferrals, tax exemptions, soft loans, guarantees 
and equity participation. 
6 The presence and the extent of a trade-off between efficiency and equity for economic growth are keenly debated 
issues (see, among others, Barca, 2009; Farole et al., 2011). 
7 The desirability of agglomerations is largely debated as it is not clear if the positive spillovers - external economies of 
scale due to firms sharing customers, suppliers, the labour and the capital markets - outperform the negative spillovers - 
urban slums with high social and environmental costs (see, among others, Melo et al., 2009). 
8 Agglomeration of firms can assume two forms: clustering or co-location of several firms that belong to the same 
industry, and clustering of many firms that belong to many different types of industries. The former may cause 
localisation economies, while the latter is expected to bring about urbanisation economies, where diversity and size of 
demand are essential features (Johansson, 2004). When we talk about agglomeration effects we mean both localisation 
and urbanisation economies; however, in the application in Section 3.5 we will focus on localisation economies. This is 
consistent with Rosenthal and Strange’s (2003) findings that localisation effects are much more pronounced than 
urbanisation effects and with the peculiarities of our application which excludes large urban centres from the analysis. 
For a survey of the literature on urbanisation and localisation economies see Beaudry and Schiffaurova (2009). 
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Second, low-income regions usually have unemployment levels considerably higher than the 
country average. Policymakers - and politicians in general - are deeply concerned with employment 
issues and often see industrial policies as a valuable tool to increase employment; however, in a 
world with perfect mobility of both labour and capital there would be no need for any place-based 
policies. As well documented in Barca et al. (2012), this is not the case of the world we live in;
9
 
rather, in the real world there is room for place-based policies to influence firms’ location and 
investment levels. In fact, the cost of moving firms in lagging areas is considered to be lower than 
the social cost due to the mobility of workers from depressed regions to more developed areas 
(primarily large urban agglomerations). Nevertheless, investment subsidy policies try to boost the 
investment level in the lagging regions reducing the cost of capital and the theoretical effect that 
this has on employment is unclear. Indeed, firms are incentivised to substitute labour with capital 
(the substitution effect)
10
 but, at the same time, the pursued output effect may arise for two reasons. 
First, the reduced cost of capital makes subsidised firms more competitive, this increase the demand 
for their products and induce such firms to expand production and purchase more of all inputs, 
including labour. Second, interregional differences in the user cost of capital stimulates investors in 
the non-assisted areas to shift production into the assisted areas, again leading to an increase in 
capital and labour demand (Schalk and Untiedt, 2000). Even in the case in which these policies just 
reshuffled jobs among geographic areas, such reshuffling may benefit the nation.
11
 
Having said that, we yet have to discuss what are the main potential negative spillovers of business 
incentive programmes. In the literature, the most quoted negative spillover is arguably the cross-
sectional substitution. This externality occurs when subsidised firms take some of the investment 
opportunities that unsubsidised firms would have exploited in the absence of the policy. In presence 
of cross-sectional substitution, publicly funded investment partially crowds-out private investment 
making the rationale in favour of business incentives less clear. On the estimation side, the 
evaluation strategies implemented in traditional evaluation works would deliver ATT estimates 
upwardly biased due to the use of a negatively affected control group. Additionally, some scholars 
                                                             
9 Labour is often immobile, and union agreements often restrict the ability of firms to offer lower wages in regions of 
higher unemployment in order to take advantage of the underutilised resources (Faini, 1999). Moreover, labour’s 
economic position, for instance in the housing market, and ties of social reproduction, for instance through family and 
the education of children, form attachments to places that can often militate against geographical mobility (Pike et al., 
2006). 
10 Capital grants are intended to increase productive capacity and thus generate employment, although indirectly and at 
the risk that capital may be substituted for labour if capital grants make the price of capital cheap relative to that of 
labour (Harris and Trainor, 2007). 
11 In low-unemployment areas, most individuals who place a high value on getting a job will get one fairly quickly. In 
high-unemployment areas, many individuals who place a high value on getting a job will remain unemployed for a long 
time. As a result, the average unemployed individual in high-unemployment areas will “need” a job more in the sense of 
placing a higher dollar value on getting one than the average unemployed individual in low-unemployment areas 
(Bartik, 1991). 
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have pointed out that in case a substantial amount of public money has been put on the market, this 
might engender different types of spillover effects called general equilibrium effects, e.g. a change 
of the price of capital in a region as a whole. To Goolsbee (1998) this could shift the industrial 
policy’s benefits from investing firms to suppliers of capital through higher prices; nevertheless, in 
case policy funds are much smaller than the national GDP, general equilibrium effects might be 
considered negligible (Criscuolo et al., 2012). Finally, another spillover frequently cited among the 
failures of business incentive programmes is the crowding-out effect. This is in act if the additional 
investment of the subsidised firms crowds-out of the market non-subsidised firms. 
3.2.1. The previous literature on industrial policies’ spillovers 
As well recognised in De Castris and Pellegrini (2012), the lack of an extensive literature on the 
spatial effect of incentives is rather curious, because several industrial policies, especially the 
policies oriented to the growth of underdeveloped regions, are designed for generating spatial 
externalities. 
This lack of spillover analyses is recently being filled up, in particular by the surge in research 
works regarding a specific place-based policy: the Enterprise Zones (EZs) programme. In this 
programme, delineated zones - usually neighbourhoods with socio-economic difficulties
12
 - are 
granted “special dispensation” status, and firms who choose to locate and invest in these zones 
benefit from temporary incentives such as tax rebates, job-trainings or relaxed regulatory barriers 
(Givord et al., 2012). Indeed, there is a rapidly growing literature on the evaluation of EZs 
programmes, and some of the authors have shown relevant attention on the empirical estimation of 
the spillovers of such policies. For example, Ham et al. (2011) find positive but statistically 
insignificant spillover effects to neighbouring areas in terms of unemployment and poverty rate, 
while Hanson and Rohlin (2013) find negative spillover effects to neighbouring areas in the number 
of establishments and employment. Concerning capital subsidies to private capital, De Castris and 
Pellegrini (2012) find a modest spatial crowding out, whereby subsidised regions attract 
employment and investment from neighbouring areas. 
The studies just presented make use of local areas as units, i.e. they try to evaluate the macro effects 
of a regional policy. EZs programmes target a large number of small areas with relatively large 
amount of public money; this arguably simplifies the spillover evaluation of the macro effects using 
areas as units (see Bondonio, 2009). On the other side, business incentive programmes are usually 
                                                             
12 Areas with numerous disadvantages, such as the shortage of a skilled labour force, a lack of public services and 
amenities such as security, a dearth of inputs and poor market potential (Givord et al., 2012). 
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directed towards firms located in a few large depressed areas and this makes impossible to adopt the 
same evaluation strategy as the EZs programmes. Criscuolo et al. (2012) and Arpino and Mattei 
(2013) adopt evaluation strategies that allow addressing specific concerns of interactions among 
firms at the firm-level.
13
 In the former paper, the authors indirectly estimate spillover effects of 
capital subsidies contrasting the results obtained at the firm-level (positive ATT in terms of 
employment and investment) with those obtained at the area-level. Overall, they find that the new 
employees come from the pool of unemployed and they do not find any evidence of reduction of 
jobs in neighbouring areas or in non-manufacturing industries. On the other hand, Arpino and 
Mattei analyse the impact of a soft loan policy modelling interactions among firms (specifying 
which firms interact with each other and the relative magnitudes of these interactions). They do not 
estimate spillover effects focusing their analysis on the estimation of the ATT. Their results show a 
positive impact on the employment level of subsidised firms but this positive impact diminishes 
with the strength of interference. 
3.3. Is it empirically possible to disentangle different spillover effects? 
In business incentive policy terms, the SUTVA holds if the causal impact of the subsidies on a firm 
does not depend on: 
1) the intensity of the subsidies and how the subsidies are dispensed;14 
2) the subsidies that other firms receive, including competitors. 
The evaluation strategies based on the SUTVA do not model how firms affect each other’s but 
assume that even if they interact, the subsidies received by one or more of these firms do not 
influence the future outcomes of the other interacting firms. This assumption seems particularly 
strong especially when we talk about competing firms. For instance, it is reasonable to suppose that 
if two firms located in the same area are direct competitors but only one of them receives public 
money, this will negatively affect the non-subsidised firm’s future performance.15 
The potentially contemporaneous presence of different spillovers, such as the crowding-out effect, 
the substitution effect and the agglomeration effects, makes appealing for a policy evaluator to 
                                                             
13 Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) make an attempt to empirically detect a conservative estimate of micro spillover 
effects resorting to an informal test. 
14 The relationship between the causal responses to different subsidy intensities is still an under-researched topic that 
has been faced only in a few papers (see Adorno et al., 2007; Becker et al., 2012). 
15 It is not possible to retrieve any information about the validity of the SUTVA from observed data. It is only possible 
to rely on subject-matter knowledge. The SUTVA is a substantive assumption, which is usually maintained, even 
though it is not always appropriate (Mealli et al., 2011). 
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single out each effect. If we had perfect information on the mechanism generating local demand, we 
could completely relax the SUTVA and come up with an evaluation strategy capable of detecting 
the extent of each spillover. Unfortunately, perfect information is just an economists’ utopia and we 
had better settle for a less ambitious aim. In fact, in this study relaxing the SUTVA does not imply 
allowing for any possible spillover effects. 
In Section 3.2 we have surveyed the most important spillovers linked to the business incentive 
programmes highlighted in the literature. In order to estimate their extent we will focus on the four 
that we consider the most relevant. Due to the very limited information on how spillovers spread, 
we will turn to assumptions that allow retrieving an estimate of two spillover parameters, each of 
which contrasts a positive and a negative spillover: 
i) the Average Spillover effect on the Affected (ASA) contrasts the positive agglomeration 
effect on unsubsidised firms with the cross-sectional substitution; 
ii) the Average Spillover effect on the New Entrants (ASNE) contrasts the crowding-out effect 
and the agglomeration effect on business births. 
3.4. A general framework to relax the SUTVA in industrial policy analyses 
Consider a group of firms indexed by        . Let the random variable    denote a treatment 
indicator which is equal to 1 if treatment is received by firm   and 0 otherwise. Let   
               represent the treatment assignment for all firms. Following Hong and 
Raudenbush (2013), we describe the potential outcomes for firm   as a function of the firm  ’s own 
treatment assignment (  ), the treatment assignment of other firms (   ), as well as the assignment 
of the focal firm to a different intensity of treatment ( ). For firm   with intensity of the treatment  , 
the potential outcome is denoted by        . 
It might then seem that causal inference is intractable.
16
 Yet, let each firm have its own set of 
influence     made up of all the firms that might affect firm’s i potential outcomes and of which 
treatment assignment is represented by     . Moreover, let   (     ) be a function of a vector  . 
Assumption 1: There exists only 1 version of the treatment (1
st
 part of the SUTVA), i.e.    
constant, ∀ ; 
                                                             
16 The SUTVA is a special case where               . In words, the SUTVA states that the treatment assignments of 
firms other than   and the intensity of the treatment received by firm i have no effect on firm i’s potential outcomes. 
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Assumption 2: Firm   might interact only with firms belonging to    , so there are         potential 
outcomes for firm i, and individual causal effects may be defined as a comparison between any two 
of them:             versus      
      
  ;      
       , and         
           . 
Assumption 3: Second order spillovers are negligible, i.e. even if firm’s h potential outcome, with 
     , is affected by the treatment of one or more firms in     this will not affect firm’s   
potential outcome when       and      . 
The latter is a simplifying assumption that allows to clearly distinguishing between affected 
untreated firms and not affected untreated firms. Fig. 3.1 illustrates an example of this framework. 
 
Fig. 3.1: Example of set of influences for 3 firms 
In this example, the set of influence of firm w is made up by the other firms located within the 
buffer around firm w (only firm h). Of the 3 represented firms, only firm k receives a subsidy. 
Focusing on the potential outcomes of firms h and w,              and          , the third 
assumption rules out that the possible influence on    of the subsidy received by firm k, affects   . 
The present framework allows estimating a large range of causal effects; however, we are 
particularly interested in two specific causal effects: 
Definition 1. The treatment effect
17
 for the subsidised firm r: 
(3.1)   (         )                 . 
Definition 2. The spillover effect for the unsubsidised firm v: 
(3.2)   (           )                 . 
                                                             
17 We might have used “policy effect” instead of “treatment effect” to remark that such effect might depend both on the 
subsidies received by firm r and on the subsidies received by other firms in its set of influence    . 
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Because of the fundamental problem of causal inference the aim is to estimate two average effects: 
Definition 3. The Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT)
18
: 
(3.3)                                     
Definition 4. The Average Spillover effect on the Affected (ASA): 
(3.4)                                       
In such framework     
  is allowed to have a different causal effect than      on firm’s i potential 
outcomes, where          
 . 
The SUTVA is a special case in which         ∀ , i.e. the future outcome of a firm does not 
depend on the treatment received by the firms belonging to its set of influence   
(3.5)  {
                                     
                                                        
 
As shown in Table 3.1, in this framework there are 3 groups of firms while in the traditional 
approach only 2. In the example reported in Fig. 3.1, firm k is the treated, firm h the affected 
untreated, and firm w the not affected untreated. 
Table 3.1. Differences in the groups of firms in the proposed framework with respect to the traditional 
framework 
 Proposed framework Traditional framework (SUTVA) 
Treated Group     # of treated firms     # of treated firms 
Affected Group     # of affected untreated firms      Ø 
Control Group     # of not affected untreated firms     # of untreated firms 
   
where,            
3.4.1. Our framework 
It would be appealing if data could reveal the extension of the spillovers but this is an extremely 
difficult endeavour, not least because of the remarkable firms’ heterogeneity. Consequently, we will 
have to turn to assumptions that inevitably are a priori and should still be considered fairly strong; 
however, those assumptions will allow partially relaxing the SUTVA and retrieving rough estimates 
of the spillover effects. 
                                                             
18 The counterfactual scenario for the ATT does not consist merely in changing the assignment for firm   from 
     to      but also in removing the subsidy to all the other firms that belong to     if necessary, i.e.     is 
changed to the null vector if      . 
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In our case the vector   that defines the set of influences consists of two variables: the economic 
distance and the spatial distance. We assume that a firm might interact only with firms having a 
limited economic distance from it (e.g. with the firms that belong to the same sector of activity).
19
 
Moreover, drawing on Tobler’s first law of geography - everything is related to everything else, but 
near things are more related than distant things - the intensity of the interactions among firms with a 
limited economic distance is assumed to be diminishing in distance and to not extend over a certain 
spatial distance
20
. In short, two firms might interact only if they satisfy the aforementioned 
conditions about the economic and spatial distances. In such framework,    might depend on the 
outcomes, the treatment received, and other covariates of the firms with which it interacts, i.e. the 
firms that belong to    . 
The pool of control firms is made up by all the eligible untreated firms with no treated firms in their 
set of influence. This pool can be enlarged using also firms located in surrounding non-eligible 
areas with similar characteristics to the eligible areas. The proximity and the similarity of the non-
eligible areas with respect to the eligible areas might rule out the presence of relevant territorial 
shocks; however, it might be possible to control for such shocks exploiting a non-eligible sector not 
strictly related with the eligible sectors. The most credible assumptions about the spillovers range 
should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
If the SUTVA holds, the new framework will still deliver unbiased ATT estimates and there will 
only be an efficiency loss with respect to traditional analyses due to the reduced number of controls 
caused by considering some firms’ outcomes to be affected by the policy when they are not. 
However, if the SUTVA does not hold, traditional evaluation strategies will not deliver any estimate 
of the spillover effects and will not be capable of retrieving unbiased ATT estimates even assuming 
that they can perfectly control for selection bias. Indeed, some of the control firms do not represent 
anymore what would have happened to the assisted firms in case of no intervention. In the case that 
the economic and spatial distance assumptions are satisfied, the estimation of the 3 welfare 
evaluation components - the ATT, the ASA, and the ASNE - brings about a sharp improvement in 
the way capital subsidies are evaluated. The first two parameters might be retrieved contrasting the 
                                                             
19 Depending on the case under analysis, it is possible to use different classifications of sectors: from the classic division 
among primary, secondary, and tertiary sector to considering the first 4 digits of the NACE 2002 classification. In the 
application in Section 3.5 we subdivide the manufacturing firms in 14 groups considering the 2-digit NACE 2002 
classification. This can be modified considering for example subgroups of manufacturing firms determined by a 
different classification. The rationale is that within each subgroup of firms it is much more common to have interactions 
both in the technology and in the product markets. 
20 The importance of proximity in business relationships has been stressed by different strands of literature (see 
Lublinski, 2003). For example, Johansson (2004) suggests that the formation of links between firms may be a distance-
sensitive activity and hence be more frequent inside a region than between regions. Indeed, proximity can facilitate 
knowledge spillovers and affect transaction costs when firms buy distance sensitive inputs. 
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treated and the affected untreated groups of firms with the not affected untreated group of firms (see 
Table 3.1) using a quasi-experimental method capable of minimising selection bias, such as the 
matching difference-in-differences (MDID) estimator presented in Section 3.5.1. 
On the other hand, relevant confounding factors make more challenging the evaluation of the 
ASNE. A possible strategy to infer the prevailing spillover effect consists of looking at the ratio of 
the number of new entrants to the number of firm exits in certain areas.
21
 Considering new entrants 
(closing-down firms) located within a limited distance from the closest treated firm belonging to the 
same sector as new entrants (closing-down) affected firms and new entrants (closing-down firms) 
with no treated firms belonging to the same sector within the same limited distance as new entrants 
(closing-down) not affected firms it is possible to compare the aforementioned ratio for the 2 groups 
of firms. In case the affected firms’ ratio prevails over the not affected firms’ ratio, this might be 
interpreted as evidence that agglomeration effects have prevailed over crowding-out effects and 
vice versa. 
3.5. Application 
3.5.1. Methods 
The main complexities in evaluating business support policies are due to the non-random 
assignment of capital incentives. Indeed, in observational studies the treatment group has usually 
features substantially different from the ones of the control group; therefore, there is a need for 
methods capable of controlling for selection bias. In absence of randomised studies, the second best 
is to find natural experiments in which capital subsidies might be considered randomly assigned for 
a subgroup of firms (e.g. Essay 2); however, when no natural experiment is available, matching 
methods are a valid alternative.
22
 Such nonparametric methods match each financed firm to one or 
more non-financed firms as similar as possible with respect to a given set of pre-treatment variables. 
Matching methods mainly rely on two crucial assumptions. First, the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA), i.e. they assume that all the relevant differences between subsidised and non-
subsidised firms are captured in their observable attributes. Second, the common support 
assumption, i.e. every subsidised firm is assumed to have at least 1 counterpart in the control group. 
In recent years, a number of papers (e.g. Iacus et al., 2012) have highlighted the misapplication of 
                                                             
21 Of course, capital subsidy policies represent only one of a number of causes that might determine firm births and 
exits. For recent contributions on the main determinants of firm births and exits see Jofre-Monseny et al. (2011) and 
Cainelli et al. (2013). 
22 Matching techniques have been used by several scholars to analyse the effectiveness of place-based policies (see, 
among others, Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011; Accetturo and de Blasio, 2012). 
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matching methods by some researchers; thus, a new class of matching methods has emerged - 
dubbed “monotonic imbalance bounding (MIB)”23 (see Iacus et al., 2011) - that curtails the misuse 
of these techniques. 
In the subsequent application we will resort to one of the MIB methods: the coarsened exact 
matching (CEM). The idea of the CEM is to temporarily coarsen each conditioning variable into 
substantively meaningful groups, exact match on these coarsened data, and then retain only the 
original (uncoarsened) values of the matched data. If different numbers of treated and control units 
appear in different strata, the econometric model must weight or adjust for the different stratum 
sizes.
24
 This is why a weighted regression of the dependent variable on the covariates is adopted at 
the end of the matching procedure. Iacus et al. (2011) show that the CEM dominates commonly 
used existing matching methods in its ability to reduce imbalance, model dependence, estimation 
error, bias, variance, mean square error, and other criteria. Nonetheless, the inherent trade-off of 
matching is reflected in the CEM too: larger bins (more coarsening) will result in fewer strata; 
fewer strata will result in more diverse observations within the same strata and, thus, higher 
imbalance (Blackwell et al., 2009). As well recognised by Ho et al. (2007), matching methods are 
data-preprocessing techniques and analysts must still apply statistical estimators to the data after 
matching. In this paper we combine the CEM with the difference-in-differences estimator (DiD). In 
fact, using differences or growth rates as outcome variables, we accommodate unobserved 
determinants of the non-treated outcome affecting the selection process for as long as these are 
constant over time. The main matching hypothesis is now stated with respect to the before-after 
evolution instead of levels (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). 
3.5.2. Data 
In our application we evaluate the Italian Law 488/92 (L488), which has been the main policy 
instrument for reducing territorial disparities in Italy during the period 1996-2007. L488 operates in 
the less-developed areas of Italy, i.e. the areas designed as Obj. 1, 2 or 5b for the purpose of EU 
Structural Funds. L488 makes available grants on capital account for projects designed to build new 
productive units in less-developed areas or to increase production capacity and employment, 
increase productivity or improve ecological conditions associated with productive processes, 
                                                             
23 In this class of matching methods the balance between the treated and the control groups is chosen by ex-ante user 
choice rather than being discovered through the usual laborious process of checking after the fact, tweaking the method, 
and repeatedly reestimating (Blackwell et al., 2009). 
24 See Iacus et al. (2012) for an illustration of how the CEM weights are computed. 
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technological updates, restructuring, relocation and reactivation.
25
 L488 allocates subsidies through 
a rationing system on the basis of regional competitive auctions. 
L488 auctions have been issued on a yearly basis. Our analysis refers to the period 1995-2001 and 
focuses on the four L488 auctions that were concluded by 2001. Data relative to the auctions derive 
from two different datasets: the administrative L488 dataset of the Ministry of Economic 
Development and a financial statement dataset, collecting data from AIDA
26
 and other sources of 
financial information. The first dataset records all the firms that applied for an L488 auction, both 
financed and non-financed, providing important information, such as the sector and the location of 
the firms. This dataset lacks financial and economic information such as investment and turnover; 
therefore, we use the financial statement dataset that basically collects financial statements for 
corporations (this means that it is skewed towards larger firms). The estimation results we present 
below rely on the assumption that there are no other governmental programmes correlated with the 
allocation of L488 funding.
27
 
In order to gauge the ATT and the spillover effects we restrict our empirical analysis to 
neighbouring areas with socio-economic characteristics rather similar, whereby only some of the 
areas were eligible for receiving public subsidies.
28
 Fig. 3.2 shows in the darker shade of grey the 
eligible areas and in the lighter shade of grey the non-eligible areas analysed in the paper.
29
 In the 
programming period 1994-1999 the eligible areas qualified for Obj.1 transfers, while the non-
eligible areas did not qualify for Obj.1 transfers, even if some small areas were considered areas 
with declining industrial production and received Obj.2 transfers.
30
 
                                                             
25 For the areas and time period under analysis, L488 financed mostly projects designed to build new productive units 
(64.1%), to increase production capacity (25.6%), and for technological updates (7%). Much less projects were financed 
for the other purposes (3% on restructuring, 0.2% on reactivation, and 0.1% on relocation). 
26 AIDA is a large dataset that contains the budgets delivered by a subset (only corporate enterprises) of over 500,000 
Italian firms to the Chambers of Commerce. 
27 Actually, a feature of L488 minimises the extent of this bias, requiring that firms applying for the incentives renounce 
any other public subsidies, even without any guarantee of receiving the L488 funds. 
28 Although in 1995 the non-eligible areas had a higher share of workers in the secondary sector - 35.5% - than the 
eligible areas - 28.2% (30.9% in Italy), the value added per employee in the manufacturing sector was rather similar: 
€34,498 in the non-eligible areas and €33,846 in the eligible areas (€38,716 in Italy). 
29 The eligible provinces (NUTS 3) are Benevento, Campobasso, Caserta, Chieti, Isernia, L’Aquila, Pescara, Teramo, 
and Naples (only the local labour system of Nola); whereas the non-eligible provinces are Ascoli Piceno, Frosinone, 
Latina, Macerata, Perugia, Rieti, Terni, and Rome (only the local labour systems of Colleferro, Velletri, and Subiaco). 
30 Obj. 1 regions receive transfers that are substantially higher in magnitude than transfers under all other lines of the 
EU’s Structural Funds programme (Becker et al., 2013). In particular, for the L488 the medium-large subsidised firms 
located in Obj.2 areas received capital grants that support up to 10-20% of the total investment expenditures, while the 
medium-large subsidised firms located in Obj.1 areas received capital grants that support up to 40-50% of the total 
investment expenditures (plus an additional 15% for small firms). Given the large difference in the share of the capital 
grant on total investment between these areas, in our application we consider all the firms located in the non-eligible 
areas as non-subsidised firms, even if they received the Obj.2 funds (we are basically assuming that those firms would 
have effectuated the subsidised investment even in the absence of the policy). 
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Fig. 3.2. Eligible and Non-Eligible Areas under Analysis 
By linking the L488 dataset with the financial statement dataset, we reconstruct a merged dataset 
for the period from 1995-2001 and after a complex process of cleaning and merging we have 2,213 
manufacturing firms (code D of the NACE 2002 classification) that were localised in the areas 
under analysis. Of these firms, 200 firms were subsidised, 679 make up the group of affected 
untreated firms, and 1,334 the control group (not affected untreated firms). The detailed 
construction of the sample is described in Appendix 3.A. 
3.5.3 Results 
The extent of agglomeration economies - not to mention the extent of the crowding-out effects and 
of the cross-sectional substitution - is still an under-researched topic. However, as well documented 
in Duschl et al. (2014), some authors have tried to shed some light on the impact of agglomeration 
economies on start-ups, firm survival, innovative and productive performance, and regional growth. 
Despite these studies, Frenken et al. (2011) argue that there is still a large gap in the understanding 
of agglomerations and in particular in the effect of localisation economies on firm performance. 
Drucker (2012) surveys the findings of a number of empirical studies that consider the spatial 
aspect of agglomerations. His survey documents a high heterogeneity in findings due especially to 
the methods adopted, the data at disposal, the type of industries analysed
31
 and the countries on 
which they are located. Still, the majority of the surveyed studies report that externalities exist 
                                                             
31 Distance may be more of an impediment to the realization of agglomeration benefits in those industries in which time 
plays a crucial role, [...] while agglomeration externalities for which the transmission mechanism necessitates less 
frequent face-to-face interactions should operate across greater distances (Drucker, 2012). 
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primarily in a narrow band surrounding a spillover generator, while a strong decay can be observed 
after a few miles. In particular, Rosenthal and Strange (2003) find that localisation economies are 
particularly strong in the first mile; while they attenuate rapidly over the first few miles, do not 
exceeding 15 miles. Additionally, they find weak evidence of urbanisation economies. Similarly, 
Henderson et al. (1995) find positive effects for both diversity and specialization externalities for 
high tech industries while mature industries experienced only localisation economies. Drawing on 
these findings we define the maximum spatial distance for possible spillover effects to be 20 km
32
 
and the economic distance limited to firms belonging to the same sector (2-digit NACE 2002 
classification).
33
 Then we look at three concentric rings of varying size to see how the ASA and the 
ASNE vary depending on the extension of the spatial distance. We exploit the untreated firms with 
no treated firms in their set of influence as controls to estimate the ATT and the ASA. We focus the 
analysis on 3 outcome variables: i) the yearly growth rate of tangible capital; ii) the yearly growth 
rate of turnover; iii) the absolute employment change for each firm. As the traditional analyses, we 
start from the estimation of the ATT identifying controls according to the following set of 
covariates: the growth rate of tangible capital from 1993-1995, the tangible capital in 1995, the 
turnover in 1995, the ROE in 1995, the number of workers in 1995, and 13 dummy variables that 
subdivide the manufacturing firms in 14 subgroups according to the NACE 2002 classification. To 
this list we add also the number of neighbours within a 10 km distance in order to take into account 
different economic environments of firms in the same sector and across sectors. We then coarsen 
the joint distributions of these covariates by creating 203 strata (103 of which were matched).
34
 In 
order to estimate the ATT, each subsidised firm is matched with one or more not affected untreated 
firms: i) belonging to the same sector of activity; ii) having similar values of the conditioning 
                                                             
32 However possible, we believe that spillovers over a 20 km threshold are negligible for most industries, most notably 
in Italy where the small and medium-sized businesses are the backbone of the economy. In order to test for this 
assumption, we repeat the analyses reported in the following, using an even “safer” spatial threshold (we remove from 
the control group the non-subsidised firms with the closest treated neighbour belonging to the same sector located 
within a spatial distance from 20 to 30 km). We find no statistically different estimates with respect to the welfare 
computation parameters reported in the following and we interpret such result as a rough empirical proof that in our 
application spillovers are negligible over the 20 km threshold. 
33 Firms’ geographical location refers to their registered office, although the vast majority of the firms in our sample 
only have one branch. 
34 The growth rate of tangible capital from 1993-1995, the turnover in 1995, and the number of neighbours with a 
maximum distance of 10km are coarsened at the median; the manufacturing firms are divided in 14 subgroups 
according to the NACE 2002 classification; and the number of workers in 1995 is coarsened using three intervals 
(micro firms, i.e. 0-9 employees; small firms, i.e. 10-49 employees; medium firms, i.e. 50-249 employees). The more 
strata the larger is the loss in treated/affected observations. This is why we do not add more coarsening variables or we 
do not coarsen some variables in quartiles instead of at the median. Such strategy allows us to analyse over 90% of the 
treated/affected firms, controlling for the residual imbalance in the weighted regression where we add also the tangible 
capital in 1995 and the ROE in 1995 as covariates. Nevertheless, in Appendix 3.C we use additional coarsening 
intervals and an extra variable to reduce the distance in terms of pre-treatment variables between treatment and control 
group. Even if this causes a substantial reduction in the number of treated/affected observations, the results are very 
similar to the ones obtained in the main analysis. 
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variables; iii) located in an area not interested by spillover effects but not too far away from the 
treated. 
Table 3.2. Pre-treatment differences between the treated/affected and the controls 
Note: Amounts are expressed in thousands of Euros. In computing the averages we use only the firms within the 
common support after the CEM procedure (191 treated obs. and the 787 controls for the ATT, 168 affected 
observations and the 615 controls for the ASA within 1 mile, 249 affected obs. and the 811 controls for the ASA 
between 1 mile and 10 km, and 236 affected obs. and the 924 controls for the ASA between 10 and 20 km). 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Before proceeding to the ATT estimation, it is important to check the similarity of the treatment 
group with the control group, not only with respect to the conditioning variables, but also in terms 
   
 Averages computed 
without using the CEM 
weights 
 
Averages computed 
after using the CEM 
weights 
 Variables 
Treatment/
Affected 
Group 
 
Control 
Group 
Difference  
Control 
Group 
Difference 
T
r
e
a
te
d
 
Tangible Capital 1995 2,313  935 (1,378)***  1,570 (743)* 
Turnover 1995 8,093  4,012 (4,081)***  6,838 (1,255) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 21.72  17.62 (4.10)  17.67 (4.05) 
ROE in 1995 17.83  9.65 (8.18)***  10.02 (7.81)** 
Nb. of workers in 1995 42.60  24.25 (18.35)***  37.13 (5.47) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 6.52  9.53 (-3.01)*  5.53 (0.99) 
Added value in 1995 2,168  1,064 (1,104)***  1,636 (532)* 
Liabilities in 1995 7,519  3,508 (4,011)***  5,849 (1670) 
A
ff
e
c
te
d
 (
fi
r
st
 m
il
e
) 
Tangible Capital 1995 1,411  929 (482)**  1,066 (345) 
Turnover 1995 4,712  3,633 (1,079)*  4,060 (652) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 10.67  12.45 (-1.78)  12.77 (-2.10) 
ROE in 1995 6.95  6.78 (0.17)  6.97 (-0.02) 
Nb. of workers in 1995 27.51  22.23 (5.28)*  26.83 (0.68) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 13.43  6.09 (7.32)***  7.86 (5.57)*** 
Added value in 1995 1,114  980 (134)  1,163 (-49) 
Liabilities in 1995 4,459  3,204 (1,255)***  3,740 (719) 
A
ff
e
c
te
d
 (
b
e
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n
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e
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 1
0
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m
) 
Tangible Capital 1995 791  786 (5)  740 (51) 
Turnover 1995 2,807  3,423 (-616)  2,918 (-111) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 16.45  16.67 (-0.22)  14.43 (2.02) 
ROE in 1995 8.93  7.03 (1.90)  6.50 (2.43) 
Nb. of workers in 1995 17.31  21.64 (-4.33)**  18.33 (-1.02) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 11.02  5.35 (5.67)***  7.91 (3.11)** 
Added value in 1995 706  908 (-202)**  782 (-76) 
Liabilities in 1995 2,657  3,008 (-351)  2,583 (74) 
A
ff
e
c
te
d
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b
e
tw
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n
 1
0
 
a
n
d
 2
0
 k
m
) 
Tangible Capital 1995 887  706 (181)**  716 (171) 
Turnover 1995 2,831  3,383 (-552)  3,447 (-616) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 11.05  20.39 (-9.34)***  11.93 (-0.88) 
ROE in 1995 5.81  11.04 (-5.23)***  6.40 (-0.59) 
Nb. of workers in 1995 18.79  21.54 (-2.75)  20.42 (-1.63) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 7.98  17.80 (-9.82)***  11.49 (-3.51)** 
Added value in 1995 803  894 (-91)  860 (-57) 
Liabilities in 1995 2,930  2,812 (118)  3,023 (-93) 
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of other pre-treatment characteristics that might systematically differ between the two groups in 
case the conditioning variables do not capture all the relevant differences between subsidised and 
control firms.
35
 The results shown in Table 3.2 are relative to the firms within the common support 
and demonstrate that the CEM procedure has allowed us to substantially reduce the pre-treatment 
differences between the treatment and the control group. The residual imbalance between the two 
groups will be additionally reduced in the weighted regression. Table 3.2 reports also the 
differences between the affected and control groups used in the estimation of the ASA. 
The ATT estimates are reported in Table 3.3 for three different matching specifications: the CEM-
DiD; the CEM-DiD without strata having more treated observations than controls
36
; and the 
Mahalanobis-metric matching after using the CEM to restrict the data to areas of common empirical 
support and removing the aforementioned strata (see Blackwell et al., 2009, for more details on the 
implementation of the CEM estimates and the STATA module cem.ado). The difference between 
the two groups of firms is from 8.94 to 10.24% for the yearly growth rate of tangible capital and 
from 1.78 to 3.08% for the yearly growth rate of turnover, while the effect on employment is of 
roughly 7-8 extra employees. All these estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level except 
for the Mahalanobis matching estimate for the yearly growth rate of turnover that is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
In this application we argue that the proximity and the similarity of the eligible and non-eligible 
areas should rule out the presence of relevant territorial shocks, but we must check this empirically. 
We adopt the matching specification described in Appendix 3.C to compare the non-subsidised 
service firms’ outcome variables in eligible and non-eligible areas. We find slightly positive 
territorial shocks but none of the estimates are statistically significant (see Appendix 3.B). We then 
estimate the ASA with the same matching specification for each of the 3 affected groups 
determined upon the distance from the closest treated firm: i) untreated firms with the closest 
neighbour of the same sector within 1 mile distance, ii) untreated firms with the closest neighbour 
of the same sector between 1 mile and 10 km distance, and iii) untreated firms with the closest 
                                                             
35 In Table 3.2 we report the results for other four covariates: the tangible capital in 1995, the ROE in 1995, the added 
value in 1995, and the liabilities in 1995. These variables are highly correlated with some of the other coarsening 
covariates; thereby it is not surprising that, if the CEM procedure has worked as expected, their level of imbalance is 
reduced between the two groups. Still, the results in Table 3.2 strengthen the hypothesis that our matching specification 
substantially reduces the pre-treatment differences between the two groups. 
36 This can be considered as an informal robustness test of the CEM-DiD results. In our sample the number of controls 
is far higher than the number of treated units, therefore we argue that strata with more treated units than controls 
represent a subgroup of firms with characteristics for which it is rare to find reliable controls (the most manifest case in 
our sample is a stratum with 4 treated observations but only 1 control). Indeed, a few controls are given too much 
weight in determining the estimates. A similar approach is followed in the estimation of the ASA and the territorial 
shocks. This informal robustness test is based on a similar rationale of the removal of outliers in the estimation of 
averages. 
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Table 3.3. ATT estimates 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Of the 787 controls there were 97 firms located in Obj.2 areas that received L488 
funds. To take into account the negative bias that these subsidies bring about we subtract the amount subsidised to those 
observations from the numerator of the first two dependent variables. Repeating the CEM-DiD estimation, we find that 
the difference between the two groups of firms is 9.33% for the yearly growth rate of tangible capital and 3.16% for the 
yearly growth rate of turnover. These estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. When we remove the 4 strata 
with more subsidised firms than controls we lose 14 observations (10 treated and 4 control firms). 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Table 3.4. ASA estimates 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Correcting for the negative bias caused by the firms located in Obj.2 areas that 
received L488 funds, we find that the difference between the two groups of firms is i) 0.82%, 1.23%, and -1.08% for the 
yearly growth rate of tangible capital; ii) 0.02%, -0.70%, and 0.19% for the yearly growth rate of turnover, respectively 
for the ASA within 1 mile, the ASA between 1 mile and 10 km, and the ASA between 10 and 20 km. These estimates 
are not statistically significant. When we remove the strata with more affected firms than controls we lose 16 
observations (10 affected and 6 control firms), 19 observations (14 affected and 5 control firms), and 12 observations (9 
affected and 3 control firms), respectively for the ASA within 1 mile, the ASA between 1 mile and 10 km, and the ASA 
between 10 and 20 km. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Bandwidth 
CEM-DiD CEM-DiD without the 4 
strata with more subsidised 
firms than controls 
Mahalanobis-metric matching 
after using the CEM to restrict the 
data and the removal of 4 strata 
Yearly growth rate of  8.94 9.25 10.24 
tangible capital (1.29)*** (1.34)*** (1.92)*** 
Yearly growth rate of  3.08 2.78 1.78 
turnover (0.70)*** (0.71)*** (0.98)* 
Absolute employment  8.16 7.07 8.17 
change for each firm (1.58)*** (1.59)*** (2.28)*** 
Nb. matched subsidised firms 191 181 181 
Nb. controls 787 783 783 
 
Bandwidth 
CEM-DiD CEM-DiD without the 
strata with more 
subsidised firms than 
controls 
Mahalanobis-metric matching 
after using the CEM to restrict 
the data and the removal of the  
strata in the previous step 
W
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e 
Yearly growth rate of  0.67 0.25 1.37 
tangible capital (1.48) (1.47) (2.14) 
Yearly growth rate of  -0.02 0.08 -0.17 
turnover (0.83) (0.84) (1.32) 
Absolute employment  -1.93 -1.96 -1.80 
change for each firm (0.94)** (0.95)** (1.42) 
Nb. matched affected firms 168 158 158 
Nb. controls 615 609 609 
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1
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Yearly growth rate of  0.93 0.43 -0.72 
tangible capital (1.21) (1.25) (1.95) 
Yearly growth rate of  -0.76 -0.59 -0.69 
turnover (0.69) (0.71) (1.06) 
Absolute employment  -0.64 -0.60 -0.23 
change for each firm (0.98) (1.03) (1.44) 
Nb. matched affected firms 249 235 235 
Nb. controls 811 806 806 
B
e
tw
ee
n
 1
0
 a
n
d
 2
0
 
k
m
 
Yearly growth rate of  -1.23 -1.33 -0.77 
tangible capital (1.27) (1.31) (1.62) 
Yearly growth rate of  0.16 -0.14 -0.25 
turnover (0.69) (0.69) (1.02) 
Absolute employment  -0.51 -0.57 -0.94 
change for each firm (1.01) (1.04) (1.56) 
Nb. matched affected firms 236 227 227 
Nb. controls 924 921 921 
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neighbour of the same sector between 10 and 20 km distance. The results are summarised in Table 
3.4. 
The ASA in terms of investment and turnover turns out to be of a mixed sign and statistically 
insignificant. On the contrary, we find negative employment spillovers of magnitude -2 that are 
statistically significant at the 5% level in 2 of the 3 specifications for firms with at least 1 treated 
neighbour in their closest set of influence. 
However, different set of covariates and coarsening procedures will yield different ATT and ASA 
estimates; this is why we check the robustness of our results in Appendix 3.C using a slightly 
different set of covariates and coarsening intervals. In general, the robustness analysis confirms the 
extent of all the ATT and ASA estimates, except for some weak evidence of negative turnover 
spillovers for affected firms with at least 1 treated neighbour interacting firm within 10 km distance. 
Assuming that the population of manufacturing firms has the same proportion of subsidised and 
affected firms that we have in our sample, we can estimate the total effect on employment of the 
L488 funds. Multiplying the ATT estimates by the number of subsidised firms and the ASA 
estimates (overlooking the statistical insignificance of some estimates) by the number of affected 
untreated firms and dividing their sum by the number of treated and affected firms, we find that on 
average each treated/affected firm has hired between 0.72 to 1.39 extra employees because of the 
L488 funds (we consider also the robustness analysis estimates). Dividing such figures by the 
average number of employees in 2001 (discounted by the extra employees’ estimates) we find an 
increase of the employment level of manufacturing firms located in an affected area from 2.24 to 
4.41 percentage points. 
Finally, we estimate the ASNE for the three concentric rings described before. We find some 
evidence of crowding-out effects that have prevailed over agglomeration effects for the affected 
firms with at least 1 treated in their closest set of influence. Considering the combined estimates of 
the first 2 ASNE parameters and assuming the absence of agglomeration effects caused by the 
policy we find that 2.30% of the closures of manufacturing affected firms in the period 1995-2001 
were caused by the L488 funds.
37
 
 
                                                             
37 It is possible that the spillover effects engendered by the policy might have determined business births or closures 
with different characteristics for firms with or without a treated interacting firm in their set of influence. However, our 
tests show no statistically significant differences in the mean of the main covariates of new entrants and closing-down 
firms for affected and not affected firms. 
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3.5.3.1. Does the ATT depend on the number of firms in the set of influence? 
Splitting subsidised firms between those with a number of neighbours above the median of their 
sector (considering only the treated) and those below the median we can gain insight into the 
different impact of the policy for firms more and less clustered. Considering only treated firms 
below such median, the effect on the growth rate of tangible capital and on employment is slightly 
larger than the estimates presented in Table 3.3, while the effect on the growth rate of turnover 
approximately doubles. These estimates are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Repeating 
the same procedure for treated firms above the median, we obtain estimates considerably lower for 
all the dependent variables and statistically significant only in a few instances. The estimates are 
reported in Table 3.5. Concerning employment, we can consider our results in line with the 
diminishing impact of the policy with the strength of interference found in Arpino and Mattei 
(2013). 
Table 3.5. ATT estimates by number of neighbours 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Correcting for the negative bias caused by the firms located in Obj.2 areas that 
received L488 funds, we find that the difference between the two groups of firms is i) 11.47% and 5.26% for the yearly 
growth rate of tangible capital; ii) 5.49% and -0.19% for the yearly growth rate of turnover, respectively for the treated 
firms with a number of neighbours below and above the median of their sector. These estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1% level for firms below the median and statistically significant only in a few instances for firms 
above the median. When we remove the strata with more treated firms than controls we lose 8 observations (6 treated 
and 2 control firms) and 15 observations (9 treated and 6 control firms), respectively for the treated firms with a number 
of neighbours below and above the median of their sector. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
Bandwidth 
CEM-DiD CEM-DiD without the 
strata with more 
subsidised firms than 
controls 
Mahalanobis-metric matching 
after using the CEM to restrict 
the data and the removal of the 
strata in the previous step 
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r Yearly growth rate of  10.87 10.87 10.62 
tangible capital (1.87)*** (1.95)*** (2.73)*** 
Yearly growth rate of  5.38 4.88 4.48 
turnover (0.95)*** (0.98)*** (1.38)*** 
Absolute employment  10.12 8.27 8.31 
change for each firm (2.04)*** (1.99)*** (3.07)*** 
Nb. matched subsidised firms 111 105 105 
Nb. controls 509 507 507 
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r Yearly growth rate of  5.12 7.76 3.07 
tangible capital (2.01)** (2.23)*** (3.16) 
Yearly growth rate of  -0.22 -0.54 -2.05 
turnover (1.03) (1.12) (1.48) 
Absolute employment  3.28 6.08 6.20 
change for each firm (2.67) (2.70)** (4.74) 
Nb. matched subsidised firms 74 65 65 
Nb. controls 247 241 241 
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3.6. Conclusions 
The main aim of this paper is to make business incentive programmes’ empirical evaluations more 
thorough and more pertinent to the policymakers’ targets. We do this by proposing a new 
framework to evaluate capital subsidy policies in order to avoid biased ATT estimates and to 
retrieve the main spillover effect estimates. This enables us to recover a global estimate of the effect 
of capital incentives on the regional economy. The present paper moves the spotlight from the 
policy effect on subsidised firms to the global effect of the industrial policy on the targeted territory 
and this makes possible to determine if the subsidies have had a welfare-enhancing role in the 
underdeveloped regions. 
Our novel approach allows evaluating the presence and the extent of micro spillover effects. 
Contrasting the agglomeration effects with the cross-sectional substitution and the crowding-out 
effect we do not find in our application statistically significant spillovers with respect to investment 
and turnover; however, we find statistically significant negative employment spillovers for 
unsubsidised firms located within one mile of 1 or more subsidised firms that belong to the same 
sector of activity. This finding emphasises that the ATT on itself is not a sufficient parameter to 
evaluate the effectiveness of an industrial policy. 
The welfare computation, i.e. the combined assessment of the 3 parameters, suggests that capital 
subsidies engender a growth process in the eligible area in terms of both investment and 
employment. The ATT estimates are in line with other evaluations of the L488 impact, such as 
Bernini and Pellegrini (2011) and Essay 2; however, the latter studies report even higher estimates 
of the policy impact on investment. Yet, in the present paper the positive effect on employment for 
the treated is partially determined to the detriment of affected firms located within a one mile 
distance of a treated firm in terms of both spillover parameters. This suggests that the subsidised 
manufacturing firms located in the eligible area attract part of their extra employees from firms 
located in the same area but not subsidised and that we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
substitution effect (firms substitute labour with capital) might be in place. This result is consonant 
with the De Castris and Pellegrini’ spatial crowding-out finding and casts some doubts on the extent 
of the positive L488 impact on employment reported by previous literature. 
A possible interpretation of our results originates from a simple observation: in the factor market 
there is, to some extent (at least within a small area), labour mobility; whereas capital is a very 
deep-rooted factor (at least in the short-run). Besides, in the product market firms located in the 
same area compete on the same job-market, while they often do not compete on the same product 
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market. Therefore, it is plausible that spillovers are much stronger with respect to employment than 
capital. Our findings are extendable to policies similar to L488 that reward projects with a high 
labour component. Policies only focused on capital deepening might engender different spillover 
effects. 
Our study leaves room to some extensions; most notably, the flourishing literature on 
agglomeration indexes (see Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Duranton and Overman, 2005; Marcon and 
Puech, 2010: Espa et al., 2013) could be exploited to move forward the estimation of average 
spillover effects, investigating the heterogeneity of industrial spillovers for different sectors. This 
direction of research might identify the sectors that most benefit from being targeted and, even more 
importantly, might help answering a crucial question for policymakers: is it best to incentivise areas 
with a large number of firms or sparsely industrialised areas? 
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Appendix 3.A. Data description 
In our application we looked for subsidised areas neighbouring non-subsidised areas. The main 
criterion adopted to choose these areas was their similarity with respect to GDP per capita,
38
 
industrial composition, and cultural traditions. Moreover, we excluded the areas of Rome and 
Naples because such large urban agglomerations have special features, clearly distinct from the 
other peripheral areas analysed. 
The initial pool of firms consisted of all the subsidised and non-subsidised firms in the areas under 
analysis. After the merging procedure (using VAT identification number as firm identifier), the total 
number of firms under analysis was 6,446. We then proceeded with the removal of certain 
categories of observations in order to estimate the ATT and the ASA: 
- The non-manufacturing firms. 
- Concerning duplicate projects, i.e., applications for more than one auction, we decided to 
exclude the non-financed projects if the referring firm had already received L488 funds in a 
previous auction. 
- We considered only firms having a meaningful balance sheet at least since 1993. 
- Projects that presented anomalies and irregularities39 have not been considered. 
- Financed firms whose investment programme was not yet concluded in 2001 have been 
discarded. 
- Large firms, i.e. firms with 250 or more employees, were discarded because of their particular 
characteristics (especially in the Italian context whereby they are quite rare). 
After verifying that the cleaning and integration procedures do not have a different impact on the 
treatment and the control group, we turned our attention to the final dataset on which the evaluation 
model was implemented. This dataset consists of 200 subsidised firms, 173 affected firms with the 
closest treated neighbour of the same sector within 1 mile distance, 269 affected firms with the 
closest treated neighbour of the same sector between 1 mile and 10 km distance, 237 affected firms 
                                                             
38 Of course, being the eligible areas part of regions (NUTS 2) with per capita GDP lower than 75% of the Community 
average in 1994 (Obj. 1 regions), they had generally a lower GDP per capita, but not very different from the non-
eligible areas considered. The percentage of their per capita GDP with respect to the Italian per capita GDP in 1995 for 
the eligible provinces was: Benevento 64%, Campobasso 73.7%, Caserta 56%, Chieti 89.5%, Isernia 67.2%, L’Aquila 
90.3%, Pescara 81.5%, and Teramo 81.1%. Concerning the non-eligible provinces the same ratio was: Ascoli Piceno 
91%, Frosinone 91.1%, Latina 80.9%, Macerata 92.8%, Perugia 98.3%, Rieti 75.6%, and Terni 91.4%. 
39 We have decided to exclude from the analysis the subsidised firms from which the Ministry of Economic 
Development has revoked more than 25% of the L488 funds. 
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with the closest treated neighbour of the same sector between 10 and 20 km distance), and 1,334 
control firms. 
In order to check for territorial shocks we have constructed another sample discarding from the 
initial pool of 6,446 firms all the firms that do not belong to the tertiary sector (code G of the NACE 
2002 classification) and that do not have a meaningful balance sheet at least since 1993. This 
subsample of service firms consists of 510 firms located in eligible areas and of 759 firms located in 
non-eligible areas. 
Appendix 3.B. Checking for the presence of territorial shocks 
When we check for the presence of territorial shocks we use the same matching specification 
adopted in the robustness analysis - reported at the beginning of Appendix 3.C - except for the 
number of neighbours variable. Coarsening the joint distributions of the selected covariates we 
create 272 strata (139 of which were matched). The results are shown in Table 3.B1. 
Table 3.B1. Territorial shocks estimates 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. When we remove the 4 strata with a number of eligible firms more than double of 
the number of controls we lose 26 observations (21 firms located in the eligible area and 5 firms located in the non-
eligible area). 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
The difference between the two groups of service firms is from 0.87 to 1.23% for the yearly growth 
rate of tangible capital, from 0.31 to 0.72% for the yearly growth rate of turnover, and from 0.04 to 
0.38 for the absolute employment change. Although all these estimates are positive, they are never 
statistically significant. Moreover, their extent is almost negligible and even subtracting them from 
the ATT the results would change only marginally. 
 
  
Bandwidth 
CEM-DiD CEM-DiD without the 4 
strata where the subsidised 
firms more than doubled 
the controls 
Mahalanobis-metric matching 
after using the CEM to restrict the 
data and the removal of 4 strata 
Yearly growth rate of  1.13 1.23 0.87 
tangible capital (1.09) (1.11) (1.44) 
Yearly growth rate of  0.31 0.49 0.72 
turnover (0.52) (0.55) (0.73) 
Absolute employment  0.20 0.38 0.04 
change for each firm (0.33) (0.35) (0.52) 
Nb. matched service firms 
433 412 412 located in the eligible area 
Nb. controls 631 626 626 
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Appendix 3.C. Robustness analyses 
We check the robustness of our results using the same set of conditioning variables used in Section 
3.5.3; except for the fact that now we do not include the subdivision of manufacturing firms in 14  
Table 3.C1. Pre-treatment differences between the treated/affected and the controls with a different coarsening 
specification 
 
Note: Amounts are expressed in thousands of Euros. In computing the averages we use only the firms within the 
common support after the CEM procedure (185 treated observations and the 968 controls for the ATT, 162 affected 
observations and the 765 controls for the ASA within 1 mile, 239 affected observations and the 965 controls for the ASA 
between 1 mile and 10 km, and 226 affected observations and the 971 controls for the ASA between 10 and 20 km). 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
   
 Averages computed 
without using the CEM 
weights 
 
Averages computed 
after using the CEM 
weights 
 Variables 
Treatment/
Affected 
Group 
 
Control 
Group 
Difference  
Control 
Group 
Difference 
T
r
e
a
te
d
 
Tangible Capital 1995 2,311  861 (1,450)***  2,010 (201) 
Turnover 1995 7,837  3,542 (4,295)***  7,090 (647) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 22.58  19.58 (3.00)  20.75 (1.83) 
ROE in 1995 17.54  8.82 (8.72)***  9.75 (7.79)** 
Nb. of workers in 1995 42.53  22.64 (19.89)***  43.85 (-1.32) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 6.55  16.24 (-9.69)***  11.62 (-5.07)* 
Added value in 1995 2,170  974 (1,196)***  1,948 (222) 
Liabilities in 1995 7,467  3,197 (4,270)***  6,822 (645) 
A
ff
e
c
te
d
 (
fi
r
st
 m
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e
) 
Tangible Capital 1995 1,354  1,155 (199)  1,174 (180) 
Turnover 1995 4,439  4,541 (-102)  4,281 (158) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 10.31  13.35 (-3.04)  11.88 (-1.57) 
ROE in 1995 4.07  4.18 (-0.11)  4.59 (-0.52) 
Nb. of workers in 1995 27.12  28.34 (-1.22)  26.91 (0.21) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 13.48  14.07 (-0.59)  16.57 (-3.11) 
Added value in 1995 1,061  1,227 (-166)  1,175 (-114) 
Liabilities in 1995 4,421  4,120 (301)  4,011 (410) 
A
ff
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0
 k
m
) 
Tangible Capital 1995 888  1,007 (-119)  835 (53) 
Turnover 1995 3,297  4,127 (-830)*  3,542 (-247) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 14.92  21.62 (-6.70)**  16.07 (-1.15) 
ROE in 1995 5.25  7.23 (-1.98)  4.35 (0.90) 
Nb. of workers in 1995 18.96  26.67 (-7.71)***  21.67 (-2.71) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 10.59  15.28 (-4.69)**  16.16 (-5.57)** 
Added value in 1995 787  1,135 (-348)***  955 (-168) 
Liabilities in 1995 3,093  3,707 (-614)  3,160 (-67) 
A
ff
e
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e
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Tangible Capital 1995 902  983 (-81)  913 (-11) 
Turnover 1995 2,937  3,991 (-1,054)**  3,431 (-494) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 10.56  20.71 (-10.15)***  14.11 (-3.55) 
ROE in 1995 5.18  9.40 (-4.22)*  5.74 (-0.56) 
Nb. of workers in 1995 19.20  24.86 (-5.66)**  21.05 (-1.85) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 7.98  15.50 (-7.52)***  14.56 (-6.58)*** 
Added value in 1995 827  1,080 (-253)**  940 (-113) 
Liabilities in 1995 3,007  3,623 (-616)  3,247 (-240) 
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subgroups, i.e. with this specification firms from different subgroups can be matched. At the same 
time, we add the investment in 1995 among the coarsening variables and we coarsen such variable, 
the growth rate of tangible capital from 1993-1995, and the turnover in 1995 into quartiles. Table 
3.C1 reports the pre-treatment differences between the treated/affected and the controls, while Table 
3.C2 and Table 3.C3 report the results for the ATT estimates and for the ASA, respectively. 
Table 3.C2. ATT estimates with a different coarsening specification 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Of the 968 controls there were 93 firms located in Obj.2 areas that received L488 
funds. To take into account the negative bias that these subsidies bring about we subtract the amount subsidised to those 
observations from the numerator of the first two dependent variables. Repeating the CEM-DiD estimation, we find that 
the difference between the two groups of firms is 11.40% for the yearly growth rate of tangible capital and 3.47% for 
the yearly growth rate of turnover. These estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. When we remove the 3 
strata with more subsidised firms than controls we lose 10 observations (7 treated and 3 control firms). 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
Table 3.C3. ASA estimates with a different coarsening specification 
Bandwidth 
CEM-DiD CEM-DiD without the 3 
strata with more subsidised 
firms than controls 
Mahalanobis-metric matching 
after using the CEM to restrict the 
data and the removal of 3 strata 
Yearly growth rate of  11.15 11.36 9.60 
tangible capital (1.18)*** (1.20)*** (2.03)*** 
Yearly growth rate of  3.40 3.04 2.34 
turnover (0.68)*** (0.69)*** (1.06)** 
Absolute employment  7.43 6.38 8.83 
change for each firm (1.56)*** (1.57)*** (2.39)*** 
Nb. matched subsidised firms 185 178 178 
Nb. controls 968 965 965 
 
Bandwidth 
CEM-DiD CEM-DiD without the 
strata with more 
subsidised firms than 
controls 
Mahalanobis-metric matching 
after using the CEM to restrict 
the data and the removal of the  
strata in the previous step 
W
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il
e 
Yearly growth rate of  0.50 0.55 -0.66 
tangible capital (1.46) (1.47) (2.10) 
Yearly growth rate of  -1.36 -1.52 -1.77 
turnover (0.83) (0.86)* (1.40) 
Absolute employment  -2.40 -2.44 -1.97 
change for each firm (1.01)** (1.07)** (1.55) 
Nb. matched affected firms 162 153 153 
Nb. controls 765 761 761 
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1
0
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m
 
Yearly growth rate of  -0.08 -0.06 -0.45 
tangible capital (1.19) (1.25) (1.85) 
Yearly growth rate of  -0.71 -1.19 -0.60 
turnover (0.68) (0.70)* (1.01) 
Absolute employment  -1.77 -1.52 -0.47 
change for each firm (1.04)* (1.06) (1.36) 
Nb. matched affected firms 239 225 225 
Nb. controls 965 960 960 
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Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Correcting for the negative bias caused by the firms located in Obj.2 areas that 
received L488 funds, we find that the difference between the two groups of firms is i) 0.63%, 0.15%, and -0.07% for the 
yearly growth rate of tangible capital; ii) -1.30%, -0.66%, and -0.15% for the yearly growth rate of turnover, 
respectively for the ASA within 1 mile, the ASA between 1 mile and 10 km, and the ASA between 10 and 20 km. 
These estimates are not statistically significant. When we remove the strata with more affected firms than controls we 
lose 13 observations (9 affected and 4 control firms), 19 observations (14 affected and 5 control firms), and 16 
observations (10 affected and 6 control firms), respectively for the ASA within 1 mile, the ASA between 1 mile and 10 
km, and the ASA between 10 and 20 km. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
We now combine the coarsening specification of the main analysis with the one of the first 
robustness analysis in order to reduce the distance in terms of pre-treatment variables between the 
treatment/affected group and the control group (Table 3.C4). Even if this causes a substantial 
reduction in the number of treated/affected observations, the tables below (Table 3.C5 and Table 
3.C6) show that the results are very similar to the ones obtained in the main analysis.  
 
 
Table 3.C4. Pre-treatment differences between the treated/affected and the controls (restricted sample) 
B
e
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n
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0
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k
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Yearly growth rate of  -0.18 -0.22 -0.97 
tangible capital (1.18) (1.21) (1.75) 
Yearly growth rate of  -0.19 -0.19 0.01 
turnover (0.68) (0.70) (1.09) 
Absolute employment  0.15 0.86 -0.34 
change for each firm (0.99) (1.02) (1.53) 
Nb. matched affected firms 226 216 216 
Nb. controls 971 965 965 
   
 Averages computed 
without using the CEM 
weights 
 
Averages computed 
after using the CEM 
weights 
 Variables 
Treatment/
Affected 
Group 
 
Control 
Group 
Difference  
Control 
Group 
Difference 
T
r
e
a
te
d
 
Tangible Capital 1995 1,670  865 (805)***  1,607 (63) 
Turnover 1995 6,961  3,703 (3,258)***  6,503 (458) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 24.35  18.62 (5.73)  21.88 (2.47) 
ROE in 1995 17.44  10.57 (6.87)**  13.39 (4.05) 
Nb. of workers in 1995 34.14  22.18 (11.96)***  35.42 (-1.28) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 6.85  7.46 (-0.61)  5.63 (1.22) 
Added value in 1995 1,820  1,013 (807)***  1,658 (162) 
Liabilities in 1995 5,961  3,210 (2,751)***  5,792 (169) 
A
ff
e
c
te
d
 (
fi
r
st
 m
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e
) 
Tangible Capital 1995 1,500  1,129 (371)  1,233 (267) 
Turnover 1995 5,238  4,415 (823)  4,605 (633) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 9.46  11.67 (-2.21)  9.53 (-0.07) 
ROE in 1995 7.21  5.35 (1.86)  5.74 (1.47) 
Nb. of workers in 1995 29.52  27.01 (2.51)  28.33 (1.19) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 13.54  7.33 (6.21)***  8.13 (5.41)*** 
Added value in 1995 1,189  1,140 (49)  1,194 (-5) 
Liabilities in 1995 4,854  3,738 (1,116)  3,961 (893) 
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Note: Amounts are expressed in thousands of Euros. In computing the averages we use only the firms within the 
common support after the CEM procedure (129 treated observations and the 342 controls for the ATT, 130 affected 
observations and the 261 controls for the ASA within 1 mile, 193 affected observations and the 357 controls for the ASA 
between 1 mile and 10 km, and 187 affected observations and the 372 controls for the ASA between 10 and 20 km). 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
Table 3.C5. ATT estimates (restricted sample) 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Of the 342 controls there were 40 firms located in Obj.2 areas that received L488 
funds. To take into account the negative bias that these subsidies bring about we subtract the amount subsidised to those 
observations from the numerator of the first two dependent variables. Repeating the CEM-DiD estimation, we find that 
the difference between the two groups of firms is 11.69% for the yearly growth rate of tangible capital and 1.96% for 
the yearly growth rate of turnover. These estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. When we remove the 
strata with more subsidised firms than controls we lose 14 observations (10 treated and 4 control firms). 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Tangible Capital 1995 820  1,134 (-314)**  808 (12) 
Turnover 1995 2,909  4,280 (-1,371)**  3,307 (-398) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 13.86  15.72 (-1.86)  13.69 (0.17) 
ROE in 1995 5.84  4.34 (1.50)  4.88 (0.96) 
Nb. of workers in 1995 18.50  26.54 (-8.04)***  20.45 (-1.95) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 10.99  6.48 (4.51)***  7.86 (3.13)** 
Added value in 1995 778  1,151 (-373)***  898 (-120) 
Liabilities in 1995 2,752  4,033 (1,281)**  3,053 (-301) 
A
ff
e
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d
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e
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0
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d
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0
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m
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Tangible Capital 1995 859  770 (89)  762 (97) 
Turnover 1995 2,737  3,205 (-468)  3,232 (-495) 
Growth rate of tang. cap. 93-95 11.55  17.73 (-6.18)  13.75 (-2.20) 
ROE in 1995 4.94  5.28 (-0.34)  5.42 (-0.48) 
Nb. of workers in 1995 18.86  21.13 (-2.27)  20.58 (-1.72) 
Nb. Of neighbours in 10km 8.38  14.98 (-6.60)***  10.94 (-2.56) 
Added value in 1995 815  880 (-65)  845 (-30) 
Liabilities in 1995 2,856  2,923 (-67)  2,940 (-84) 
Bandwidth 
CEM-DiD CEM-DiD without the 
strata with more subsidised 
firms than controls 
Mahalanobis-metric matching 
after using the CEM to restrict the 
data and the removal of the strata 
in the previous step 
Yearly growth rate of  11.43 11.96 9.72 
tangible capital (1.76)*** (1.78)*** (2.66)*** 
Yearly growth rate of  1.90 2.14 1.80 
turnover (0.93)** (0.96)** (1.36) 
Absolute employment  5.56 7.02 8.50 
change for each firm (1.99)*** (2.00)*** (2.71)*** 
Nb. matched subsidised firms 129 123 123 
Nb. controls 342 339 339 
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Table 3.C6. ASA estimates (restricted sample) 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Correcting for the negative bias caused by the firms located in Obj.2 areas that 
received L488 funds, we find that the difference between the two groups of firms is i) 1.41%, 0.94%, and 0.71% for the 
yearly growth rate of tangible capital; ii) -1.22%, -0.95%, and 0.68% for the yearly growth rate of turnover, respectively 
for the ASA within 1 mile, the ASA between 1 mile and 10 km, and the ASA between 10 and 20 km. These estimates 
are not statistically significant. When we remove the strata with more affected firms than controls we lose 15 
observations (10 affected and 5 control firms), 16 observations (12 affected and 4 control firms), and 10 observations (8 
affected and 2 control firms), respectively for the ASA within 1 mile, the ASA between 1 mile and 10 km, and the ASA 
between 10 and 20 km. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
Bandwidth 
CEM-DiD CEM-DiD without the 
strata with more 
subsidised firms than 
controls 
Mahalanobis-metric matching 
after using the CEM to restrict 
the data and the removal of the  
strata in the previous step 
W
it
h
in
 1
 m
il
e 
Yearly growth rate of  1.21 1.73 -0.46 
tangible capital (1.66) (1.76) (2.35) 
Yearly growth rate of  -1.27 -1.10 -1.89 
turnover (0.99) (1.00) (1.47) 
Absolute employment  -2.63 -3.22 -1.86 
change for each firm (1.71) (1.79)* (2.59) 
Nb. matched affected firms 130 120 120 
Nb. controls 261 256 256 
B
e
tw
ee
n
 1
 m
il
e
 a
n
d
 
1
0
 k
m
 
Yearly growth rate of  0.78 0.54 0.72 
tangible capital (1.44) (1.49) (2.00) 
Yearly growth rate of  -1.00 -1.24 -1.48 
turnover (0.87) (0.89) (1.30) 
Absolute employment  -0.74 -1.07 0.05 
change for each firm (1.26) (1.33) (1.82) 
Nb. matched affected firms 193 181 181 
Nb. controls 357 353 353 
B
e
tw
ee
n
 1
0
 a
n
d
 2
0
 
k
m
 
Yearly growth rate of  0.59 -0.35 -0.87 
tangible capital (1.50) (1.51) (2.08) 
Yearly growth rate of  0.67 1.03 1.28 
turnover (0.84) (0.87) (1.16) 
Absolute employment  0.74 0.64 -0.11 
change for each firm (1.23) (1.27) (1.84) 
Nb. matched affected firms 187 179 179 
Nb. controls 372 370 370 
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